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INTRODUCTION

"They'll have to pry that money out ofmy cold, dead hands before
I'll pay it. "'
Bonnie Jimenez worked as a supply chain director at Otter Products,
Inc., a company that produces protective cases for electronic devices
with $168.9 million in annual revenue.2 Jimenez was fired a few
months after she advised her supervisors that Otter Products should
accurately report to customs officials the value of its imported
products. 3 Mario Industries, a family-owned lighting business in
Roanoke, Virginia, had to lay off employees and reduce shifts when it
lost long-standing contracts to a competitor who was underpricing
lighting products.' Mario's competitor was able to beat market prices
by buying cheap lighting in China, falsifying the country of origin, and
avoiding paying import duties.' GES, a Birmingham, Alabama, familyowned business that sold graphite rods used in steel production lost
major customers to a competitor who undercut prices.' The competitor
purchased graphite rods made in China and reduced its costs by falsely
marking products as made in India to avoid paying import taxes.7
Consumers of prescription drugs such as Xanax@ and Valium®
unknowingly purchased medications that contained entirely different
ingredients or substandard dosages.' Importers of these drugs labeled
them as "gifts" or "toys" to avoid paying import taxes and thereby
preempted customs inspections of the defective drugs.' Customers
throughout the United States bought what they thought was sole,
I Response by CEO when advised to stop misrepresenting the value of company imports.
Complaint at 17, United States ex rel. Jimenez v. Otter Products, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-02937RM-MJW (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2011) (Appendix A, #41).
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id at 16-17.
4 Complaint at 5, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No. 1: 10-cv001 13-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010) (Appendix A, #25).
5 Id. at 4, 15.
6 Complaint at 6, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Ameri-Source
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix A, #54)
[hereinafter Graphite Electrode Sales].
7 Id. at 3.
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Indicted in Prescription Drug Smuggling
Ring (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-indicted-prescription-drug-smug
gling-ring.
9 Id. See also Complaint at 30, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2014) (Appendix A, #5 1).
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grouper, or flounder but which was, in fact, Vietnamese catfish laced
with prohibited antibiotics.o Seafood importers nationwide had
falsified the country of origin and the type of fish they were importing
into the United States to circumvent inspections of the fish and avoid
import taxes." These are the victims of trade fraud: the United States
Treasury that is robbed of millions of dollars in import duties when
businesses lie about their imported goods, honest businesses that are
hurt by dishonest competitors, consumers who are exposed to unsafe
products, employees who are fired for blowing the whistle, and
industries that are targeted for ruin by companies that are dumping
products and engaging in predatory pricing..
Why engage in trade fraud? The simple answer is money, By lying
about what they are importing, unscrupulous businesses can avoid
millions of dollars in import taxes owed, reduce their costs, and beat
competitors' prices. In today's global world, where international trade
permeates every economic exchange, there is tremendous financial
incentive for dishonest businesses and individuals to lie when they
import, receive, or sell imported products. They can avoid millions of
dollars in duties and tariffs and avoid customs inspection of defective
products. Realistically, there is little chance these modern-day
smugglers will be caught.' 2 Countries' borders are too vast, the volume
of imports too great, global customs inspections too porous, and law
enforcement resources too few for effective monitoring or deterrence
of trade fraud. This Article suggests what can be done to tame this wild,
new frontier of white-collar crime.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses what trade fraud
is and how it fits within the political debate on trade. We argue that
whatever the merits of the free trade-protectionism debate, no one has
the right to lie about what he or she is bringing into a country. For this
reason, stopping trade fraud is not a question of politics but of lawwhether unscrupulous should be allowed to take advantage of those
who follow the rules. Part II addresses the nature of trade fraud and
discusses how it compares to other white-collar crime and why it is
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to
Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007
/June/07_enrd_413.html.
II Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Illinois Resident Pleads Guilty to Illegally
Dealing in Falsely Labeled Fish From Vietnam (Jan. 14, 2008), https://www.justice.gov
/archive/opa/pr/2008/January/08_enrd_026.html.
12 See generally PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: How ILLICIT TRADE MADE
AMERICA (2013) (discussing the history of smuggling and its role in the growth of the
United States).
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particularly difficult to detect, prove, and deter. Part III discusses the
database of cases we have created for this Article. This database
consists of all criminal and civil trade fraud cases pursued by the U.S.
Department of Justice from 2000 to 2016. While such a database would
appear to be readily available, it is not, within the Department of Justice
or otherwise, because of inconsistencies in reporting and incomplete
data sets. Thus, our database is the first to compile all trade fraud cases
in the United States. We discuss the trends revealed in this collection,
including the growth of criminal prosecutions and the criminal offenses
used to pursue modem-day smugglers, the increasing reliance on the
civil False Claims Act (FCA) to combat trade fraud, the types of trade
fraud pursued, the characteristics of each type of trade fraud, and the
practical and policy implications of pursuing the various types of trade
fraud. Part IV concludes with our recommendations on how to enhance
the fight against trade fraud.
As the discussion in this Article shows, trade fraud cases are full of
intrigue. There are "factories" in India allegedly producing
sophisticated products that are, in reality, old, dilapidated buildings
incapable of any production." There is a spurned lover who brings
customs officials a hard drive showing millions of dollars of import
fraud by her boss's company.' 4 There are falsified shipping manifests,
fake shipping labels, and misbranded products. There are ships that
travel to ports worldwide to conceal the country origin of the products
they carry.'
I
WHAT IS TRADE FRAUD AND WHY SHOULD IT BE PROSECUTED?

Those who favor free trade policy advance the argument of absolute
advantage.' 6 This argument posits that free trade policies advantage
13 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, 1 47.
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Companies and CEOs Indicted in School Supply
Scam (Oct. 22, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/gan/press/2012/10-22-12.html.
15 Criminal Indictment at 19-20, United States v. Apego, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-00350-SCJAJB (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2012) (Appendix A, #32).
16 See generally I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 69 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776). In an argument known as
"absolute advantage," renowned economist Adam Smith reasoned that free trade benefits
both parties because each nation can trade goods it produces at lower costs in exchange for
the goods it produces at higher costs. Id. at 423 ("If a foreign country can supply us with a
commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of
the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage.").
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everyone because each nation can trade goods it produces at lower costs
in exchange for goods it can produce only at higher costs. Free trade
proponents also argue that free trade policies allow countries access to
foreign suppliers who can produce higher quality products than if those
countries produced such products themselves.'" This leads to the
exchange of new ideas and technology,'" reduces war,' 9 and promotes
individual rights.20
Those who favor trade protectionist policies argue that protection is
needed to shield "infant" domestic industries until they mature enough
to compete internationally.2 ' They also argue that countries can raise
This specialization or division of labor increases productivity because workers become more
efficient in their tasks, which results in the rise of a country's "real revenue and wealth." Id.
Classical economist David Ricardo expounds on Smith's ideas through his theory of
"comparative advantage," which states that each country should specialize in producing
goods for which it has an advantage relative to other countries. See DAVID RICARDO, On
The PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy and Taxation, in THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF DAVID RICARDO 128-49 (Piero Sraffa ed., 2004) (1817) (using England and Portugal as
an example to explain that global consumption of wine and cloth increases if each country
specializes in the good for which it has a lower opportunity cost to produce relative to the
other country).
17 See SMITH, supra note 16, at 459 ("A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade
is certainly more likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious and commercial
nations.").
18 Id at 18.
19 See, e.g., FREDERICK BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES, reprinted in ECONOMIC

HARMONIES xxxvi (George B. de Huszar ed., W. Hayden Boyers trans., Foundation for
Economic Education 1968) (1850) (concluding that "[w]e should also have an end to ... the
constant threat of war . .. and those entrusted with the responsibility of governing would
work together for, and not against, the universal harmony. . . ."). See also Richard Cobden,
On The Effects Of Protection Of The Agricultural Interests of the Country, Speech to British
House of Commons (Mar. 13, 1845), in CHARLES K. ADAMS, REPRESENTATIVE BRITISH

ORATIONS 152 (1884) (advocating against the British Corn Laws in his famous speech to
the House of Commons when the statesmen proclaimed that the free flow of goods "is
calculated to knit nations more together in the bonds of peace .... ).
20 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., 1952) (1690); FREDERICK BASTIAT, PROPERTY AND LAW, reprinted in SELECTED

ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 112 (George B. de Husza ed., Seymour Cain trans.,
Irvington-on-Hudson 1964) (1848) (stating that to impose government regulations that
prohibit the exercise of the natural right of free exchange is to "legitimize an act of plunder
and to violate the law of justice"); SMITH, supra note 16, at 307 (arguing against the
government's wasteful, inefficient, and destructive practices, classical liberalism
economists believe that free trade restores "the natural system of liberty" to pursue their own
crafts); 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 531-33 (D. Appleton

and Company 1883) (1848).
21 First introduced by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, economists have
repeatedly revisited the "infant industry" argument since its formulation. See Suhail
Abboushi, Trade Protectionism, Reasons and Outcomes, 20 COMPETITIVENESS REV. 5, 388
(2010) (stating that, theoretically, the state lifts the temporary protection until these infant

2018]

Trade Fraud:The Wild, New Frontier
of White Collar Crime

7

their national income by improving their purchasing power of exports 22
and by protecting domestic workers as they transition to other jobs or
industries when their positions become obsolete because of trade
competition. 23 Lastly, protectionists argue that a pro-protection trade
policy allows countries to engage in "strategic trade policy" and "level
an unequal playing field"24 by subsidizing a domestic company or
industry so it can better compete in an international market.2 5
Trade tariffs are one way in which countries implement their trade
policies. When businesses import products, they often are required to
pay import taxes. The type, size, and frequency of such tariffs depend

industries are mature enough to compete with international competitors). See also Anne 0.
Krueger & Baran Tuncer, An EmpiricalTest ofthe InfantIndustry Argument, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 5, 1142-43 (1982); see generally, e.g., Tran Lam Anh Duong, Optimal Infant Industry
Protection During Transition to World Trade Organization Membership, A Numerical
Analysis for the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry, 23 J. INT'L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 4, 49293 (2014) (summarizing briefly the modern empirical and theoretical research sources
regarding "infant industry" literature).
22 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 107-08 (2015) (discussing a country's
terms of trade). A country's terms of trade are "the ratio at which a country exchanges
exports for imports." Countries that impose protectionist trade restrictions, such as adjusting
export or import prices, can potentially increase its purchasing power of exports thereby
raising its national income. Id. However, a country's ability to improve its terms of trade
usually requires the ability to influence international markets. See, e.g., id. at 108
(exemplifying a country's terms of trade through oil, diamond, and rare metal industries).
23 Cletus C. Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal & Geoffrey E. Wood, Protectionist Trade
Policies, A Survey of Theory, Evidence and Rationale, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis 22
(JAN./FEB. 1988), reprinted in JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN & DAVID A. LAKE, INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 312 (Routledge 4th

ed. 2000). According to this theory, when a country's imports increase from international
competitors, affected domestic industries pivot by lowering cost and reducing production.
Id. This adjustment may result in productive resources reallocating to other domestic
industries, thereby causing workers in specific industries to lose their jobs or relocate. Id.
24 See id. at 315. Amidst trade deficits and unbalanced reciprocity agreements,
protectionists claim that governmental measures-even retaliatory ones-may be necessary
to protect disadvantaged, domestic companies from the threat of an unequal trading field.
Id. However, the concept of "fair trade," like many other protectionists' arguments, remain
hotly contested by critics-both domestic and abroad. Id.
25 See IRWIN, supra note 22, at 111. Strategic trade policy is a measure "in which the
government undertakes a precise, strategic intervention on behalf of domestic firms in a way
that increases national welfare." Id. In these situations, governments subsidize exports from
a domestic company that is competing with an international rival with the intent to siphon
profits that might otherwise shift to the foreign competitor. See Coughlin, supra note 23, at
314 (using American economist Paul Krugman's Boeing and Airbus aircraft manufacturing
hypothetical to illustrate effect of strategic trade policy). Protectionists argue that, absent
governmental intervention, a country might lose an opportunity to acquire additional profits
in the global market. See IRWIN, supra note 22, at 112.
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on a nation's stance on free trade versus protectionism. 26 Import taxes
range from a few dollars to millions of dollars depending on the product
and the volume of imports. Importers self-declare what they are
importing and its value; taxes are assessed based upon these
representations. Misrepresentations to minimize or avoid these import
taxes is fraud. Because the process for assessing and paying import
taxes is largely voluntary and unchecked, trade fraud is easy to commit
and hard to detect. Because import taxes can be significant, the
incentive to engage in such fraud is significant.
When trade laws are flouted and duties evaded, an array of
stakeholders are injured. Law-abiding importers who have adjusted
their business practices by shifting supply chains-generally buying
their supplies at greater cost or paying import taxes now assessed-are
injured by the dishonest importers who gain large profit margins by
offering customers dumping level prices.27 Industries that have made
business decisions, financial investments, and undertaken contractual
and debt commitments based on U.S. government commitments in
trade policies are injured when import laws are not enforced.2 8
Consumers who are subject to unsafe products are harmed when greedy
importers avoid paying import taxes by hiding dangerous information
about medicine, food, or other products they bring into the country. 29

-

26 Countries that engage in free trade policies still may impose import duties. For
example, the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1985. See Israel
Country Commercial Guide, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Israel-Import-Tariffs (last
updated May 30, 2017). This agreement substantially lowered tariffs between the two
countries essentially eliminating most tariffs between them. Nevertheless, both countries
retain tariffs on agricultural goods from the other. See id
27 See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 58, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v.
Ameri-Source Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix
A, #54); Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, No.
1:10-cv-00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010) (Appendix A, #55).
28 See, e.g., Complaint at 5, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No.
1:10-cv-001 13-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010) (Appendix A, #25); Complaint at 58, United
States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Ameri-Source Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013) (Appendix A, #54); Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27
(Appendix A, #55).
29 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for
Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://wwwjustice.gov
/archive/opa/pr/2007/June/07 enrd 413.html (Appendix A, #7); United States v. Wong
(Appendix A, #7); United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
2013) (Appendix A, #33); Giddens, supra note 9 (Appendix A, #51).
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H
WHY TRADE FRAUD Is DIFFICULT TO DETECT, PROVE, AND
DETER

Trade fraud, like all white-collar crime, is difficult to detect, prove,
and deter.30 There are $2.71 trillion of imports 3 1and 32.4 million trade
entries into the United States each year.3 2 Imports arrive in the United
States through 328 ports, 7,000 miles of land borders, and 95,000 miles
of shoreline.33 Customs Agents inspect only a tiny percentage of these
imports.3 4 Even if customs' inspections were increased exponentially,
however, they would miss most trade fraud. Modem-day smuggling is
too diffused and too concealed for detection by visual inspection.
Forensic accounting to trace monetary transactions, grants of immunity
to obtain testimony, analysis of paper trails, piercing of fictitious
organizations, and dissecting layers of fraudulent transactions are the
essential investigatory tools. But these tools are expensive, timeconsuming, and resource intensive. Furthermore, they do not even
guarantee success. Even with such yeoman investigative efforts, most
trade fraud, like most white-collar crime, is missed by law enforcement.

&

30 Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L.
REv. 905, 926 (2002) ("With computerization and the Internet, economic wrongdoing has
entered a different world . . . [it] is easier to commit and harder to stop.") [hereinafter
Information as a Commodity]; Pamela H. Bucy, Elizabeth P. Formby, Marc S. Raspanti
Kathryn E. Rooney, Why Do They Do It? The Motives, Mores, and Characterof White
CollarCriminals,82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401 (discussing trend noted in study of white collar
practitioners "that white collar crimes and their investigations have become more
complex").
31 See INT'L TRADE ADMIN.,

U.S. TRADE OVERVIEW 2016,

5, 6 (Apr.

2017),

http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tgian/documents/webcontent/tg
ian .005537.pdf.
32 See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 6, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents
/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-508C.pdf (last visited May 31, 2017).
33 Id. at 8 (last visited May 31, 2017).
34 See

generally U.S.

CUSTOMS

AND

BORDER

PROT.,

PERFORMANCE

AND

ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files
/assets/documents/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-508C.pdf (last visited May 31, 2017).
35 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Mfg. Co., No.
3:09-CV-438 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2010) (Appendix A, #31); Criminal Indictment, United
States v. Blyth, No. 1:10-cr-00011 -CG-M (Jan. 28, 2010) (Appendix A, #19); Bill Singer,
A Fishy Tale: Defendants Plead Guilty to Seafood Felonies, FORBES (May 5, 2011),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2011/05/05/a-fishy-taledefendants-plead-guilty-to
-seafood-felonies/#1add4dblleOl; United States v. Popa, No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D.
Ala. Jan. 28, 2010) (Appendix A, #20); Indictment, United States v. Garcia-Adarme, No.
3:13-cr-00353-FAB (D.P.R. June 20, 2013) (Appendix A, #36).
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While all white-collar crime is difficult to detect, 36 trade fraud is harder.
Smugglers' success is limited only by human ingenuity. Trade fraud is
hidden in layers of organizations, concealed in byzantine electronic
communications, and obscured by money laundering. The simplest
exchange spans the globe; the smallest shipment involves international
monetary transactions. Successful detection of trade fraud is hampered
by the varying honesty, competence, and resources of nations' customs
regulators.
I
ANALYSIS OF THE DATABASE: TRADE FRAUD CASES FROM 2000

TO 2016
To examine trade fraud, we sought to collect all prosecutions of
import trade fraud, criminal and civil, brought by the U.S. Department
of Justice between 2000 and 2016. Section A describes our search
methodology and overall findings. Section B discusses the trends
shown in these cases, including the increase in criminal prosecutions,
the growing reliance on the FCA, the types of trade fraud pursued, the
characteristics of each type of trade fraud, and the practical and policy
implications of pursing the various types of trade fraud.
A. Data Collection Methodology and Overview ofFindings
Using multiple search terms 3 7 in various databases, 38 we searched
for trade fraud cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice between

36 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940-41 (discussing how "the complex
nature of economic crime and the diffuse nature of the business environment" make it
difficult for regulators to detect white collar crime in time to prevent it).
37 We used the following terms, individually and in combination: "trade fraud;" "Trade
Agreements Act;" "antidumping;" "countervailing duties;" "CVD;" and "False Claims
Act."
38 We first ran a Google search of the current and archived Department of Justice press
release collections (located at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ and https://www.justice.gov
/archive/opa/pr/ respectively). The results of these searches were manually inspected, and
those that were on-topic were noted and copied.
After the initial search, we found that there were press releases held on Department of
Justice (DOJ) servers that were not included in the main archive, primarily in individual
pages for United States Attorney offices. To find these we ran an expanded search of the
entire DOJ domain (https://www.justice.gov), using search terms similar to the press release
archive, with additional terms such as "for immediate release" that would denote a press
release. To be as exhaustive as possible, we expanded the previous search to the entire .gov
domain.
We then searched federal district court dockets via Bloomberg Law for the complaints of
all cases we found in the press release search. We also initiated a keyword and cause of
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2000 and 2016. We confined our collection to import fraud cases
because there are no duties or tariffs associated with export fraud.39
Using this combined search methodology, we found forty-seven trade
fraud cases4 0 involving hundreds of defendants that have been brought
by the U.S. Department of Justice between 2000 and 2016. The
defendants include individuals, "mom and pop" businesses, and large
conglomerates. Appendix A catalogs these cases by name, description
of facts, type of fraud, and status or outcome.
Several trends are apparent from this collection of cases. In the
sixteen years between 2000 and 2016, court activity in import trade
fraud cases increased nine-fold with a major spike beginning in 2012,
which peaked in 2014. As Chart 1 below demonstrates, both criminal
prosecutions and civil FCA cases increased during this sixteen-year
period. During this same time period, forty-two percent of trade fraud
cases have been criminal prosecutions and fifty-eight percent have been
brought under the civil FCA. The criminal prosecutions include
charges of smuggling, and smuggling-related offenses, such as receipt
of smuggled goods, 4 1 misbranding,4 2 and prohibited trade in wildlife,

action search for False Claims Act and trade, antidumping, or countervailing duties. Due to
the limitations of PACER, where these documents are sourced, we were only able to search
the user keyed metadata, and not the actual content of the filings.
Lastly, we conducted a Westlaw case search in all federal district courts, using the same
key words.
39 We did not include cases that were dismissed. So, for example, we did not include the
complaint filed by a relator that included trade fraud allegations when the settlement did not
include trade fraud and the relator's claims were dismissed. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Sandager v. Dell Marketing L.P., 872 F. Supp. 2d 801 (D. Minn. 2012). See also Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Company Agrees to Pay $32.5 million for
Alleged Overbilling of the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 1, 2014). Nor did we include cases in
which the United States did not intervene and where the courts dismissed the action on other
grounds such as statute of limitations or whether there was fraud. See United States ex rel.
Thornton G. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (The court
held that the relator's claim barred by the FCA's six-year statute of limitations; FCA's
statute of limitations extends beyond six years only when the United States is a party, not in
relator actions in which the United States has not intervened; the defendants' alleged false
statement about product (whether components were permanently installed at the time of
importation) was immaterial; there was no customs fraud because the product (bus shells)
qualified for duty-free treatment.).
40 As can be seen in Appendix A, we have included fifty-seven entries in our catalog of
trade fraud cases. We found it helpful in some cases to list multiple stages of some cases,
but the total number of cases is forty-seven.
41 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 541-54 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
42 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331(a), 352(a) & (f), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140).
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fish, and plants.43 Criminal prosecutions also include generic whitecollar offenses such as wire fraud," conspiracy,4 5 money laundering, 46
and obstruction of justice. 47 Sentences levied after conviction tend to
be minimal: probation is common. When incarceration is imposed,
sentences generally range from one-to-three years.
Restitution in significant amounts has been ordered in some criminal
cases ($12 million,48 $7.16 million,4 9 $6.246 million,o $3 million,
$1.017 million52 ). Forfeiture of assets, also in significant amounts, has
been imposed upon conviction ($12 million, 3 $400,000,54 $197,930").
As with other ihite-collar frauds, parallel criminal prosecutions and

43 The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-77 (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140).
44 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
45 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
46 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
47 18 U.S.C.S. § 1505 (Lexis through Pub. L. 115-140).
48 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, President of Company that Illegally Imported
Catfish Sentenced to More Than Five Years in Federal Prison (May 19, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/president-company-illegally-imported-catfish-sentenced
-more-five-years-federal-prison.
49 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cigarette Importer Agrees to Pay U.S. $3.1
Million as Part of $10.6 Million Settlement with Justice Department (Dec. 4, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07 civ 966.html
(discussing
United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc., No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 25,
2005) (Appendix A, #8)).
50 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Father and Son Sentenced for Defrauding the
United States (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/father-and-son-sen
tenced-defrauding-united-states (discussing United States v. Magness, No. 1:10-cr-00125WMS-JJM (Sept. 8, 2015) (Appendix A, #50)).
51 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, Caviar Distributor Pleads Guilty to
Multi-Million Dollar Customs Fraud Scheme (Nov. 29, 2012), https://www.ice.gov
/news/releases/caviar-distributor-pleads-guilty-multi-million-dollar-customs-fraudscheme. See also Appendix A, #30.
52 Complaint at 2, United States v. Fai Po Jewellery, No. 3:12-cr-00068-SLG (D.C. Ak.
Aug. 8, 2012) (Appendix A, #28).
53 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Found Guilty of Conspiracy Involving the
Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam (Oct. 30, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html (discussing United
States v. Lam (Appendix A, #12)).
54 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Online Clothing Business Owners Sentenced for
Customs Fraud, Money Laundering (May 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca
/pr/online-clothing-business-owners-sentenced-customs-fraud-money-laundering
(discussing United States v. Nguyen, No. 1:13-cr-000360LIO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2013) (Appendix A, #42)).
55 Indictment at 1, United States v. True World Foods Chicago, LLC, No. 2:07-cr-01271
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007) (Appendix A, #10).
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civil suits under the civil FCA have been brought in a number of trade
fraud cases.56
All civil trade cases have been brought under the civil FCA.
Resolution in FCA cases include some significant settlements: $45
million,5 1 $27.95 million,5 t and several settlements of $15 million. 59
Awards to relators include $7.875 million, 60 $3.335 million, 6 1 $2.4
million,6 2 $2.25 million,6 3 $2.1 million,' $1.5 million,65 and $1.2
million.6 6

56 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Ludlow v. CMAI Indus., LLC, No. 2:09cv-14860 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (Appendix A, #26). See also Magness, supra note 50; Reade
Mfg. Co., supra note 27 (Magness was prosecuted for the same activity at issue in the civil
FCA case, Reade Mfg. Co.).
57 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Japanese-Based Toyo Ink and Affiliates in New
Jersey and Illinois Settle False Claims Allegations for $45 Million (Dec. 17, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/japanese-based-toyo-ink-and-affiliates-new-jersey-and-illi
nois-settle-false-claims-allegation.
58 United States ex rel. Safina Office Products v. Office Depot, No. 1:03-cv-00003-RMC
(D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2003) (Appendix A, #2, 3, 4, 5). See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Defendant Office Max Settles Case for $9.8 million (May 19, 2005); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Defendant Office Depot Settles Case for $4.75 Million (Sept. 19, 2005);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defendant Staples Settles Case for $7.4 Million (Oct.
18, 2005); and Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defendant Corporate Express Settles
Case for $5.02 Million (Feb. 10, 2006).
59 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Texas-Based Importers Agree to Pay $15 Million
to Settle False Claims Act Suit for Alleged Evasion of Customs Duties (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/texas-based-importers-agree-pay-15-million-settle-false
-claims-act-suit-alleged-evasion [hereinafter Univ. Lofts] (Appendix A, #52); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, California-Based Z Gallerie LLC Agrees to Pay $15 Million
to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Apr. 26, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-based-z-gallerie-llc-agrees-pay-15-million-settle
-false-claims-act-suit-alleging [hereinafter Wells] (Appendix A, #56).
60 Dickson, supra note 35.
61 Safina Office Products, supra note 58.
62 Wells, supra note 59.
63 Univ. Lofts, supra note 59.
64 Alex Lawson, Whistleblower Awarded $2M in Apparel Duty Evasion Suit, LAW 360
(May 2, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/533498/whistleblower-award
ed-2m-in-apparel-duty-evasion-suit. See also United States ex rel. Krigstein v. Siouni & Zar
Corp., No. 1:11-cv-04247-CM (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013) (Appendix A, #40).
65 False Claims Complaint, United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No.
3:05-cv-00033-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2005) (Appendix A, #34).
66 Ludlow, supra note 56.
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Chart 1. Trade fraud cases-criminal and civil by year
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All import trade fraud cases, criminal or civil, fall into two types of
fraud: (1) misrepresentations regarding the nature of the goods
imported, and (2) misrepresentations regarding the origin of goods.
Importers falsify the country of origin for two reasons: to avoid
antidumping or countervailing import duties, and/or to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. Chart 2 below summarizes the trends
in types of trade fraud.
Chart 2. Trade fraud cases-type of fraud by year
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B. Discussion of Cases
"Commercial smuggling schemes not only rob the government of
vital revenues, they also undermine the economy and penalize
businesses thatfollow the rules. "67
1. MisrepresentationsRegardingthe Nature ofProductsImported
Import duties are imposed based upon what is being imported, and
sometimes, on the value or quantity of goods. To avoid or reduce the
duties they would otherwise owe, unscrupulous importers falsify what
they are importing or understate the weight" or value 69 of their
imports. 70 They falsify the travel route of goods to make them appear
to be shipped "through" the United States rather than as "entering" U.S.
commerce.n They falsely declare imported goods to be "samples"
rather than goods for sale,72 misrepresent how goods are made,73 and
falsely describe ingredients in imports, including prescription drugs, 74
magnesium powder used in anti-aircraft flares,7 ' and computer
networking equipment.7 6

67 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Online Clothing Business Owners Sentenced for
Customs Fraud, Money Laundering (May 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr
(statement
/online-clothing-business-owners-sentenced-customs-fraud-money-laundering
of Mike Prado, U.S. Homeland Security Investigation discussing U.S. v. Nguyen).
68 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cigarette Importer Agrees to Pay U.S. $3.1
Million as Part of $10.6 Million Settlement with Justice Department (Dec. 4, 2007),
(discussing
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07 civ 966.html
United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc. No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 25,
2005) (Appendix A, #8)).
69 Fai Po Jewellery, supra note 52; Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 16, United States ex
rel. Karlin v. Noble Jewelry Holdings Ltd., No. 1:08-cv-07826-JGK-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2011) (Appendix A, #23).
70 Krigstein, supra note 64; Wong, supra note 29.
71 Complaint, United States v. Chavez, No. 3:12-cr-03137-MMA (S.D. Cal. July 23,
2012) (Appendix A, #29).
72 Nguyen, supra note 54.
73 An "assist" is "materials or components in the imported merchandise supplied directly
to indirectly by the buyer of such merchandise without adequate compensation, for use
related to the production on sale for export to the U.S." Jimenez, supra note 1.
74 Giddens, supra note 9.
75 Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27.
76 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Maryland Man Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison
for Importing and Selling Counterfeit Cisco Computer Networking Equipment (Aug. 18,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2012/03/15/cone
Sent.pdf (discussing United States v. Cone, No. 11-4888 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2010), rev'd,
No. 11-4934 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2013) (Appendix A, #22)).
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A criminal prosecution of individuals in Texas exemplifies this type
of fraud. In United States v. Giddens,n defendants falsely claimed they
were importing "gifts" or "toys" when in fact they were importing
medications such as Xanax@, Valium@, Cialis@, Viagra@, and Still
NOx@.7 8 The defendants not only avoided import duties by concealing
the true nature of their goods, but also preempted any possible
inspections by customs officials of the medications-which were in
fact defective. According to the law enforcement officials, "None of
the pills ... were legitimate. Some were sub-potent, but most contained
entirely different active ingredients than the legitimate, approved
versions." 79
United States v.
Cone provides
another example of
misrepresentation of an import's nature.8 0 Defendants in Virginia were
convicted at the conclusion of a twelve-day jury trial for
misrepresenting the nature of their imports, computer equipment, to
avoid or minimize import duties.' Operating "a large-scale counterfeit
computer networking business" in China, defendants -"altered Cisco
products" and used pirated software.8 2 To conceal their fraud and avoid
import duties, they mislabeled their imported products and packaging,
used false names and addresses on importation documents, and "hid
millions of dollars of counterfeit proceeds through a web of bank
accounts and real estate held in the . . . names of family members in
China." 83 The jury's verdict included forfeiture of assets "including two
Porsches, one Mercedes, seven bank accounts containing more than
$41.6 million, as well as four homes and three condominiums with a
total value of more than $2.6 million." 84
The prosecution of a customs broker in California demonstrates the
type of convoluted schemes defendants undertake to conceal the true
nature of their imports. Gerardo Chavez was hired by wholesalers of
goods to manage the importation of their goods into the port at Long
Beach, California, including payment of import duties." When the
77 Giddens, supra note 9.
78 Id.
79 Id
80 Cone, supra note 76.
81 Nathan M. Peak, $2 Million FCA Settlement, ASHCRAFT & GEREL, http://ashcraft

andgerel.com/news/2-million-fca-settlement (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
82 Id
83 Id.
84 ]d.

85 Chavez, supra note 71.
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goods arrived in Long Beach, truck drivers hired by Chavez transported
the goods to warehouses in southern California where false paperwork
and data entries were created to reflect that the goods were not entering
U.S. commerce but were being transshipped to other countries, such as
Mexico." The goods were then shipped to destinations throughout the
United States." This scheme avoided millions of dollars in import
taxes, which Chavez had already collected from the wholesalers.88
Chavez and his conspirators pocketed the import duties paid by his
clients, thus cheating them as well as the U.S. Treasury.89 In addition,
because Chavez and his conspirators "had now effectively imported the
goods tax-free, they could, in turn, sell more merchandise at cheaper
prices-and reap greater profits-than their law-abiding competitors,
including American manufactures of the same goods." 90 This scheme
led to the importation of more than $100 million in foreign goods and
caused a loss of more than $18 million in U.S. taxes.91
2. MisrepresentationsRegardingCountry of Origin to Avoid Import
Duties
Some import duties are imposed only on designated products from
certain countries.92 Most common among these country and product
specific duties are antidumping and countervailing duties.9 3 Of all
tariffs assessed in today's global market, antidumping and
countervailing duties have become the most prevalent, at least in the
United States.94 These duties are also the most controversial.

86 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney, President of San Diego Customs Brokers
Association Pleads Guilty to Overseeing $100 Million Customs Fraud (Nov. 15, 2012).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Id.

92 See, e.g., Safina Office Products, supra note 58; United States ex rel. Schweizer v.
OCE N.V., No. 1:06-cv-00648-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2006) (Appendix A, #6); United States
v. Intertex Apparel Groups, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-05313-NRB (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008)
(Appendix A, #11).
93 See Enforcement and Compliance: Antidumping and Countervailing Investigations
InitiatedAfter January 1, 2000, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://enforcement.trade.gov/stats
/inv-initiations-2000-current.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2016) (listing the total AD/CVD
investigations opened and which of those resulted in duties).
94 Id
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a. What are Antidumping and CountervailingDuties and Why Have
Them?
Antidumping duties ("AD") are designed to "protect against foreign
companies 'dumping' products on U.S. markets at prices below cost." 95
ADs are assessed when businesses from non-market countries sell a
product in the United States at a price lower than the price for which
the product is sold in the country of origin-i.e., the country of origin
("normal value")9 6 and as a result, an industry in the United States is
"materially injured, threatened with material injury," or the
establishment of an industry is "materially retarded." 97 The duty
assessed is the "dumping" margin which is the "amount by which the
normal value exceeds the export price."98 Antidumping duties currently
assessed by the United States include, for example, 305% on Chinese
imports of pure magnesium, 329% on Chinese saccharin, and 429% on
Chinese drill pipe. 99
Countervailing duties ("CVD") are assessed to "offset foreign
government subsidies."'o Subsidies are especially common in nonmarket economies where the government owns certain industries or
pumps considerable public and governmental resources into an
industry.'o' CVDs are assessed on the products that benefit from such

-

95 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Importers to Pay Over $3 Million to Settle
False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-importers-pay-over-3-million-settle-false-claims-act
-suit-alleging-evaded-customs.
96 Id
97 In antidumping cases, the United States will impose duties if (1) Commerce determines
that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United
States at less than its fair value and (2) the Commission determines that an industry in the
United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment
of an industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of imports of that
merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for
importation. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
98 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677(35) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
99 See 66 Fed. Reg. 57936 (Nov. 19, 2001); 68 Fed. Reg. 40906 (July 9, 2003); 76 Fed.
Reg. 11757 (Mar. 3, 2011).
100 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Ohio-Based Basco Manufacturing Co. to Pay
$1.1 Million for Allegedly Falsifying Customs Documents to Evade Import Duties on
Chinese Products (Nov. 14. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-based-basco-manu
facturing-co-pay- 11 -million-allegedly-falsifying-customs-documents-evade (Complaint at
¶¶ 30-34, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products, Ltd.,
No. I 1-cv-368 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2013) (Appendix A, #37)).
10 See Appendices B-4 and B-5 noting number of countervailing duty orders on Chinese
products-a non-market economy. For a fuller discussion, see Special Report: The World
Economy, THE ECONOMIST 5-16 (Oct. 1, 2016).
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subsidies. Sample CVDs imposed by the United States include 206%
of value on Chinese ammonium sulfate; 210% on Chinese carbon and
steel alloy plates, and 235% on Chinese corrosion-resistant steel
products.102
The major products on which AD and CVD are imposed are iron and
steel, followed by chemicals, and plastic/rubber/stone/glass. 103 Goods
from China, India, and Korea are the subject of most AD and CVD
duties currently imposed.104 Worldwide, the number of ADs and CVDs
have increased in the past two years following steady increases
beginning in 2011.1o5 Not surprisingly, the uptick in the imposition of
ADs and CVDs by the U.S. coincides with a surge in trade fraud
prosecutions by the United States.' 0 6 Since 2000, there have been
multiple cycles in the number of ADs and CVDs imposed, with dips in
the global number of ADs and CVDs in 2007 and 2011, and peaks in
2008 and 2016.107 Currently, Brazil, India, the EU, the United States,
and China impose the greatest number of ADs; Russia, Indonesia, and
South Korea impose the fewest.' The United States imposes the
highest number of countervailing duties of any other country.' 09 The
United States imposes four and a half times more CVDs than the next
highest imposing country, and more than all other countries

102 See 81 Fed. Reg. 76332 (Nov. 2, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 62871 (Sept. 13, 2016); 80 Fed.
Reg. 68843 (Nov. 6, 2015). In countervailing duty cases, the United States will impose
duties if it determines that (1) the government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with
respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported,
or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States, and (2) in cases of
merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, the Commission determines
that an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material
injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by
reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of
that merchandise for importation. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
103 Appendix B-1.
104 Appendix B-5.
los Appendix B-6.
106 See supraChart 1.
107 Appendix B-6.
108 Appendix B-2.

109 The United States imposed 9 CVDs in 2015 (and 216 from 1981 to 2015), compared
to China (which imposed none in 2015, and 6 from 2010 to 2014), Brazil (none in 2015 and
10 from 2001 to 2015) and Canada (2 in 2015 and 33 from 1985 to 2015). Appendix B-5.
Note that data maintained.on the number of CVDs is not maintained in congruent time spans.
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combined.1 o While the total number of ADs and CVDs imposed
worldwide is small, they account for millions of dollars.
As noted, antidumping and countervailing duties are imposed after
findings of "dumping" (ADs) or "subsidization" of products (CVDs).
Additionally, before antidumping or countervailing duties are imposed,
there must be a finding that importation of products materially impacts,
retards, or weakens American industries."' All findings are made in an
administrative process that involves two federal agencies, with
multiple hearings and appeals."' 2 All parties are given the opportunity
to be heard, present evidence, and seek appeals. This litigation process
is lengthy and requires investment of time, money, and resources by
the parties. For this reason and because of the harm to law-abiding
businesses that result from trade fraud"1 3 we argue that whatever one's
views on the free trade versus protectionism debate, it is compelling
public policy to aggressively pursue trade fraud. The parties that have
invested in this administrative process are entitled to rely on the
findings and orders that result from this process. They have made
business decisions based upon the outcome of this administrative
process. Their reliance on the rule of law inherent in these
administrative proceedings is justified.
The first step in the administrative process leading to possible
imposition of import duties is a petition filed with the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DoC) and the International Trade Court (ITC) by the
party seeking imposition of the duties.' 14 The petitioner must show that
it is a "qualified party,"' " and that "an industry in the U.S. is materially
110 Id.

Ill See, e.g., Michael 0. Moore & Mark Wu, Antidumping and Strategic Industrial
Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China-X Ray Equipment Dispute, 14 WORLD
TRADE REV. 239, 239-86 (2015); Thomas A. Hemphill & George 0. White Ill, China's
National Champions: The Evolution of a National Industrial Policy-Or a New Era of
Economic Protectionism,55 THUNDERBIRD INT'L Bus. REV. 194, 202 (2013).
112 This process does not determine whether products are imported with the intent, by a
nation or a company, as part of an economic policy, to target, weaken, impede or destroy a
particular industry. Rather, the assumption of such intent is presumed from the fact that
products are being sold at below value cost (antidumping duties) or are subsidized by a
country (countervailing duties) and the sale of such products "materially injured, threatened
with material injury" or the establishment of an industry is "materially retarded." 19
U.S.C.S. § 1673 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
113 See supratext accompanying notes 2-10; infra text accompanying notes 130-94.
114 See U.S.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY

HANDBOOK 1-3 (June 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/trade remedy/documents/handbook
.pdf; 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671a (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
''5 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1677(9)(C)-(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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injured or threatened with material injury or that the establishment of
an industry is materially retarded" by reason of the antidumping or
subsidy activity." 6 There must be an affirmative preliminary
determination on the petition by the DoC' 17 before the matter may
proceed to the ITC for investigation." 8 If the ITC's determination is
affirmative following its investigation, the ITC relays its facts and
conclusions back to the DoC" 9 which then determines whether there is
a "reasonable basis" to believe or suspect that "dumped" merchandise
is being sold for less than the fair value or that a countervailing subsidy
is being provided for the merchandise at issue.1 20 If the DoC finds in
116 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 702(b), 732(b), 1677(9) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The
petition must be accompanied by "information reasonably available to the petitioner
supporting those allegations." 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 167 1a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub.
L. No. 115-140). The petition must also comply with several other rules which govern: (1)
the contents of a petition, (2) filing requirements, (3) notification of foreign governments,
(4) pre-initiation communications with the Secretary, and (5) assistance to small businesses
in preparing petitions. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.202(b)-(h) (2016). The Commission also refers
interested parties to the additional regulations located under 19 C.F.R. § 351.202 regarding
the contents of their petitions. 19 C.F.R. § 351.202(a).
117 DoC determines whether the petition (1) has been filed by or on behalf of the industry
interested party's petition, (2) sufficiently alleges the necessary elements, and (3) provides
the information reasonably available to petitioner supporting the allegations. 19 U.S.C.S. §§
1671a(c)(1)(a), 1673a(c)(1)(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The DoC has twenty
days to respond from the filing of the petition, but may delay its initial determination up to
additional twenty days in cases involving "exceptional circumstances" to "poll or otherwise
determine support for the petition by the industry." 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671a(c)(1)(b),
1673a(c)(1)(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). If the DoC's determination is negative,
the agency closes its investigation and the proceedings conclude. 19 U.S.C.S. §§
1671b(a)(1)(B), 1673b(a)(1)(B) (2012).
118 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(2), 1673a(c)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In the
preliminary phase of the Commission's investigation, the body has forty-five days after the
date on which the petition is filed to determine, based on the information available, whether
there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured, or
is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded, by reason of imports of the merchandise and that the imports of the
subject merchandise are not negligible. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(a)(1), 1673b(a)(1) (Lexis
through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This preliminary phase of investigation includes several
additional stages of investigation. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 114, at 11-5
("The preliminary phase of the Commission's investigation may be broken down into six
stages: (1) institution of the investigation and scheduling of the preliminary phase, (2)
questionnaires, (3) staff conference and briefs, (4) staff report and memoranda, (5) briefing
and vote, and (6) determination and views of the Commission."). Ifthe DoC's determination
is negative, the agency terminates the proceedings. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671(a), 1671b(a),
1673b(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
119 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(f), 1673b(f) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
120 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(b), 1673b(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In
countervailing duty investigations, if DoC concludes there is a reasonable basis for its
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the affirmative, the ITC makes its final determination on material
injury, threatened material injury, or material retardation.121 If the ITC
finds such harm, the DoC engages in a lengthy 22 fact-finding process
that includes submission of questionnaires, reports, comments, and
briefs by the parties.1 23 At the conclusion of the fact finding process,

decision, the agency estimates a subsidy rate for each firm or country investigated. 19
U.S.C.S. § 1671b(d)(1)(A)(i) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This determination is
made within sixty-five days after DoC initiates an investigation. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1671b(b)(1)
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). But in extraordinarily complicated cases, or by request
of the petitioner, DoC's determination can be made within 130 days. 19 U.S.C.S. §
1671b(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). In antidumping investigations, if
DoC concludes there is a reasonable basis for its decision, the agency estimates the
weighted-average dumping margin and an estimated all-others rate for all exporters and
producers not individually investigated. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (Lexis through
Pub. L. No. 115-140). This determination is made 140 days-or 190 days in extraordinarily
complicated cases or by request of the petitioner-after DoC initiates its investigation. 19
U.S.C.S. §§ 1673b(b)(1)(A), 1673b(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
If DoC's preliminary determination is affirmative, the agency orders (1) the posting of a
cash deposit, bond, or other security for each entry of the subject merchandise in an amount
based on the estimated weighted average dumping margin or the estimated all-others rate
and (2) the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise which are entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which notice of the
determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(d)(l)2),
1673b(d)(1)-(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
121 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The
Commission completes its investigation either before the 120th day after DoC makes its
affirmative preliminary determination, or the 45th day after DoC makes its affirmative final
determination, whichever is later. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 167 1d(b)(2), 1673d(b)(2) (Lexis through
Pub. L. No. 115-140). This last stage consists of several phases before the Commission
publishes its final determination and views. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note
114, at 11-15 ("The final phase of the Commission's investigation may be broken down into.
eight stages: (1) scheduling of the final phase, (2) questionnaires, (3) prehearing staff report,
(4) hearing and briefs, (5) final staff report and memoranda, (6) closing of the record and
final comments by parties, (7) briefing and vote and (8) determination and views of the
Commission."). Once the Commission makes its final determination, it issues a public
notification of its findings and the determination is published in the Federal Register. 19
U.S.C.S. §§ 167ld(d), 1673d(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
122 The Commission completes its investigation either before the 120th day after DoC
makes its affirmative preliminary determination, or the 45th day after DoC makes its
affirmative final determination, whichever is later. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671 d(b)(2), 1673d(b)(2)
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
123 If DoC's preliminary determination is affirmative, the agency orders (1) the posting
of a cash deposit, bond, or other security for each entry of the subject merchandise in an
amount based on the estimated weighted average dumping margin or the estimated all-others
rate and (2) the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise which are entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which notice of the
determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671b(d)(l)-(2),
1673b(d)(l)-(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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the DoC makes a final determination of injury and issues a public
notice of its findings.1 24
b. The Rationale Behind Antidumping and CountervailingDuties
The following hypothetical demonstrates the rationale for imposing
ADs and CVDs. Assume Businesses A and B manufacture widgets.
Business A embarks on a plan to capture the market. Business A prices
its widgets below its production cost, increases production, and floods
the market with a low-cost alternative to Business B's higher-priced
product. Business A succeeds in driving Business B out of business.
In a market economy, if Business A chooses to assume the risks of
its plan to force out its competitor, it may do so as long as it follows all
applicable laws. Business A's aggressive plan is permissible because
Businesses A and B are subject to the same laws and the same capital,
tax, and other regulatory requirements. Neither business receives help
from the government, such as subsidies, that is not available to the
other. Businesses A and B are competing on a level playing field.
Business A's activity is not fair, however, if the government subsidizes
Business A but not Business B, or provides advantages to Business A
that it does not provide to Business B, thus unfairly altering the market
conditions.
Antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) seek to
address situations when the players are not subject to the same market
conditions. As proponents of such duties argue, imposition of AD or
CVD duties provide protection when:
[T]he goal of foreign manufacturers that sell goods at an artificially
low price, for example, below cost . .. is to charge such prices long
enough to put out of business competitors lacking the capacity to
absorb the costs of matching the artificially low price for any length
of time. 125

124 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). This last
stage consists of several phases before the Commission publishes its final determination and
views. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 114, at 11-15 ("The final phase of the
Commission's investigation may be broken down into eight stages: (1) scheduling of the
final phase, (2) questionnaires, (3) prehearing staff report, (4) hearing and briefs, (5) final
staff report and memoranda, (6) closing of the record and final comments by parties, (7)
briefing and vote and (8) determination and views of the Commission."). Once the
Commission makes its final determination, it issues a public notification of its findings and
the determination is published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 167ld(d), 1673d(d)
(Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
125 Dickson, supra note 35.

24

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19, 1

The harm from unfair market conditions is shown in the above
hypothetical, if Business A receives government support when
Business B does not. The above hypothetical also demonstrates the
potential harm to consumers who pay higher prices for lesser quality
widgets and receive worse customer service when Business A gains
control of the market. Law enforcement officials describe the harm that
can result to consumers from "dumping" activity by subsidized
economies: "By eliminating competition, foreign firms subsidized by
foreign governments, are then free to raise prices to anti-competitive
levels and recover the temporary cost of the dumping scheme."' 2 6 In
the above example, consumers who need widgets are harmed when
Business A, now with a subsidized monopoly, raises prices, cuts
quality, and reduces customer service.
c. CriminalProsecutionofAntidumping and CountervailingDuties
As noted in Section A above,1 27 violations of antidumping and
countervailing duty laws may lead to criminal prosecution. This is aptly
demonstrated in multiple prosecutions of importers of Vietnamese
catfish who falsified the country of origin to avoid antidumping duties
and to help hide prohibited chemicals in their fish.
Catfish farmers throughout the United States had previously
petitioned and obtained antidumping duties from the DoC on imports
of catfish from Vietnam after showing that catfish was being dumped
by Vietnamese companies in the U.S. market at prices less than the fish
were sold in Vietnam (with currency adjustments). 28 Thereafter, a
number of seafood companies in the United States continued to import
Vietnamese catfish but falsely listed their imports as sole, grouper, and
flounder to avoid paying the now applicable antidumping duties on

.

126 Id. As law enforcement officials explain: "Countervailing and antidumping duties are
designed to provide a level playing field between companies that purchase products
domestically and those that import products from countries that subsidize their production
... Importers who use fraud to avoid paying these duties gain an unfair business advantage
over competitors who abide by the rules." Id.
127 Dickson, supra note 35.
128 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Individuals Arrested for
Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://wwwjustice.gov
/archive/opa/pr/2007/June/07_enrd_413.html (United States v. Wong, Appendix A, #7);
True World Foods, supra note 55; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Found Guilty
of Conspiracy Involving the Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam
(Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html
(United States v. Lam, Yavelberg, Appendix A, #12).
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catfish.1 29 Some of these catfish also posed a health hazard, testing
positive for malachite green, a chemical compound used in overseas
fish farming, and Enrofloxin, an antibiotic banned by the FDA.' 30 Both
malachite green and Enrofloxin are banned from use in food in the
United States.' 3 ' The defendants were convicted of Lacey Act
offenses.13 2
In a similar case, a honey broker in Texas was prosecuted for falsely
stating that Vietnamese honey was from Malaysia and India to avoid
$37.9 million in antidumping duties. 3 3 This honey contained
Chloramphenicol, another antibiotic banned in the United States in
food products.1 34
d. Use of the Civil False Claims Act to PursueAntidumping and
CountervailingDuty Violations
There are more civil suits aimed at antidumping and countervailing
duty fraud brought under the FCA than criminal prosecutions for this
activity.1' The case of United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales
(GES) v. Ameri-Source,1 3 6 demonstrates use of the FCA to combat
antidumping violations. This case also demonstrates how private
parties can initiate FCA cases and work hand-in-hand with the U.S.
Department of Justice in pursuing them.' 37 GES, a multi-generational,
family-owned company, imports and sells graphite electrodes which
are used to heat molten scrap metal in steel production.' 38 For years,
GES imported graphite electrodes from a variety of foreign sources

129 Press Release, Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to Import Falsely Labeled
Fish, supra note.128.
130 True World Foods, supra note 55.
131 Id.

132 Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
133 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Texas Honey Broker Sentenced to Three Years
in Prison for Avoiding $37.9 Million in Tariffs on Chinese-Origin Honey (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndiI/pr/texas-honey-broker-sentenced-three-years-prisonavoiding-379-million-tariffs-chinese (discussing United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No.
1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2013) (Appendix A, #33)).
134 Id.

135 See supra Chart 2.
136 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6.
137 The ability of private parties to file FCA actions and participate in them is unique in
American law. This aspect of the FCA is discussed more fully in Part IV (c). See infra text
accompanying notes 241-63.
138 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, ¶ 13.
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including sources in Ukraine, France, and, until 2009, China. 3 9 In
2009, an antidumping duty of approximately 160% was imposed on
"small diameter" graphite electrodes imported from China.'4 0
Imposition of this duty rendered the Chinese products unprofitable and
GES located other suppliers, at a significantly higher cost.141 Not long
after, GES discovered that it was losing long-time customers to a
competitor that was selling small diameter graphite rods at a lower
cost.1 42 The prices at which the competitor, Ameri-Source, was selling
graphite electrodes were consistently lower than anything that could be
obtained on the global market-except from Chinese manufacturers.1 4 3
This led GES to suspect that Ameri-Source, was continuing to import
graphite electrodes from China and somehow avoiding the 160%
antidumping duties.'
Using its contacts within the industry, GES investigated what
Ameri-Source was doing.'45 GES hired investigators who traveled to
the Mumbai, India "facility" that allegedly was producing the graphite
rods for Ameri-Source.1 4 6 The "factory" was a "dilapidated warehouse"
incapable of "any significant job work," and "too small to load or
unload an international shipping container of the type normally used to
transport small diameter graphite electrodes and other graphite
products." 47 It was incapable of graphite electrode production, which
"requires very expensive and highly advanced technology."'4 8
Additionally, through conversations with its customers and by
examining the rods sold by Ameri-Source, GES determined that the
rods sold by Ameri-Source had been stripped of all manufactureridentifying data. "4 Unlike the GES electrodes, which "were clearly
labeled as 'Graphite India' with metal tags, specification sheets, and
139 Id ¶ 22.
140 Antidumping Duty Order: Small Diameter Graphite Electrodes from the People's
Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 8775 (Feb. 26, 2009).
141 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, TT 58-60.
142 Id ¶ 56.
143 Id. ¶ 57.
144 Id ¶ 58. As GES explained: "The market price for small diameter graphite electrodes
in the US was approximately $2.25 per pound. Ameri-Source was taking business away
from legitimate market participants by offering small diameter graphite electrodes at $1.85
per pound and that the country of origin is India, South Korea or the Ukraine." Id.
145 Id. TT 61-65.
146 Id ¶47.
147 Id.
148 Id.

149 Id.

64.
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'Graphite India' stickers on the product," the Ameri-Source electrodes
had no identifying markings except for a small, white "Made in
India"' sticker on the end of the rods.'s GES contacted Indian
manufacturers of graphite electrodes who confirmed that they had
"never sold electrodes to Ameri-Source and that any representation that
Ameri-Source had imported electrodes from India ... was false."' 52
Using a worldwide shipping database, GES traced the route of the
Ameri-Source graphite rods.' 53 The route showed that Ameri-Source's
rods came from China through India, from China through South Korea,
or directly from China into the United States. 15 4 In each case, false
shipping manifests concealed China as the true country of origin and
enabled Ameri-Source to avoid paying millions of dollars in
antidumping duties.' 5 GES brought its information to the DoC, the
United States partially intervened, and the case settled for $3 million.
In a parallel criminal proceeding, Ameri-Source pled guilty to two
felony counts of smuggling goods into the United States.' 56
Fraud to avoid countervailing and antidumping duties was also at
issue in United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Ink Manufacturing Co.,
Ltd.157 Nation Ford Chemical Company (Nation Ford) and others
petitioned and obtained imposition of countervailing duties on "CVP23," ink used in printer cartridges manufactured in India and China.158
Nation Ford had previously presented evidence that production of
CVP-23. in these countries was subsidized by their governments and
dumped in the United States, and that such actions were harming
domestic producers of CVP-23.1 59 As a result, countervailing duties
were imposed on CVP-23 by the DoC.' 60 Thereafter, importers
continued to import CVP-23, but falsely claimed that the ink was
150 Id
151 Id
152 Id ¶69.

153 Id. ¶¶ 50-51.
154 Id
155 Id. 43.
156 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Four Pennsylvania-Based Companies and Two
Individuals Agree to Pay $3 Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded
Customs Duties (Feb. 22, 2016).
157 Dickson, supra note 35.
158 Id ¶ 27.
159 Id. ¶ 28.
160 Id T 29. The petitioners also obtained anti-dumping duties on CVP-23 upon proof of
dumping practices on United States markets by Chinese and Indian manufacturers. Id.
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produced in Japan and Mexico.1 6 ' In so doing, they avoided millions of
dollars in antidumping and countervailing duties.' 6 2 Nation Ford and
its CEO, John Dickson, brought a case under the civil FCA against
Toyo Ink Manufacturing Companyl 63 and the United States
intervened." The case settled for $45 million. Dickson, as relator,
received $7,875,000 of the settlement.165
3. MisrepresentationsRegarding Country of Origin to Qualifyfor
U.S. Government Contracts
The Buy American Act provides that goods supplied to the federal
government, except those specifically exempted, must be produced in
the United States.1 66 The Trade Agreements Act requires that if goods
sold to the United States government are not made in the United States,
they must be made in a country with an approved reciprocal trade
agreement with the Unites States.' 67 The Trade Expansion Act requires
that goods deemed essential to national defense be manufactured in the
United States ori specified ally countries.1 68 Dishonest individuals and
companies that seek to sell nonconforming goods to the federal
government misrepresent the country where goods are produced to
meet this requirement.1 69 This false representation constitutes crimes
under Titles 16, 18, and 21 of the United States Code as well as
violations of the civil FCA under Title 3 1.170
Our database revealed no criminal prosecutions between 2000 and
2016 for contract fraud involving misrepresentations regarding country
of origin. However, there were multiple civil cases brought under the
FCA. Examples of civil cases include a case against an Indiana
ST 33, 98, 132.
162 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Japanese-Based Toy Ink and Affiliates in New
Jersey and Illinois Settle False Claims Allegations for $45 Million (Dec. 17, 2012).
163 Dickson, supra note 35.
164 Press Release, supra note 162.
165 Id
166 See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-(d) (1988) (repealed Jan. 5, 2010); see
also 41 U.S.C. §§ 1801-03 (2012) (replacing the original Buy American Act which was
repealed).
167 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2501-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No.
115-140).
168 Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C.S. § 1862 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
169 The incentive for this type of fraud likely will increase if the current Administration
seeks to "maximize" buy American laws for federal procurement contracts. Exec. Order No.
13788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017).
170 See, e.g., Safina Office Products, supra note 58 (Appendix A, #2, 3, 4, 5) (use of the
FCA); Apego, supra note 15 (Appendix A, #32); Giddens, supra note 9 (Appendix A, #51).
161 Id
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company that sold Malaysian-made furniture to the United States
Marine Corps,"' an Ohio company that sold Chinese-made lighting
products to the United States Air Force and Environmental Protection
Agency, 7 2 an Illinois company that sold Chinese information
technology, equipment, and services to numerous federal agencies
(including Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Internal Revenue Service,
and Secret Service),' 73 a New Jersey company that sold Chinese
electronics to federal agencies while falsely representing that the
countries of origin were South Korea and Mexico,174 and a Minnesota
company that sold Chinese and Malaysian medical products for cardiac
patients and for use in spinal surgeries while falsely representing that
the products were manufactured in the United States or other approved
countries.175

The case of United States ex rel Reade Manufacturing Company v.
ESM Group, Inc.1 76 is an example of defendants who misrepresented
the country of origin of their product to meet national security
requirements for sale of goods deemed essential to national defense to
the U.S. government.1 77 In 2004, Reade Manufacturing Company
(Reade), located in New Jersey, was the only supplier approved by the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to sell ultra-fine magnesium
powder to the U.S. military services.1 78 Magnesium powder "is a highly
volatile substance" used to produce countermeasure flares.179 These
flares are carried by military aircraft to defend against incoming heatseeking missiles.so Because ultra-fine magnesium powder is deemed
"critical to the support of national defense,"'"' by authority of the
Secretary of the Army, it must be manufactured in the United States or
171 Complaint at ¶18, United States ex rel. Furniture by Thurston, Inc. and Lee Thurston
v. J. Squared, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-01058-RMC (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2008) (Appendix A, #14).
172 Scutellaro, supra note 4.
173 Liotine, supra note 65.
174 Complaint at 18, United States ex rel. Simmons v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., No. AW- 11-2971 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2011) (Appendix A, #44).
175 United States ex rel. Cox v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 0:12-cv-02562-PAM-JSM (D. Minn.
Oct. 5, 2012) (Appendix A, #47).
176 Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27.
177 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, Section 806, P.L. 105-261
(Oct. 17, 1998), 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (Presidential Directive, Apr. 20, 2017 regarding steel
industry).
'78 Id.
179 Id 112; Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27.
180 Id.
181 Id. ¶ 16.
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Canada.182 Reade began losing long-time customers who said they were
switching suppliers because they could purchase ultra-fine magnesium
powder elsewhere "at a significantly lower price."' 83 Reade officials
suspected their competitors were importing magnesium powder from
China, "the largest and least expensive source of fine magnesium
powder."'

84

Reade officials began to investigate. Using their sources within the
industry, Reade officials learned that a Chinese company was shipping
ultra-fine magnesium powder into the United States by falsely labeling
it as "magnesium desulphurization reagent" and hiding it inside
aluminum rods.' Reade officials traced the falsely labeled shipments
through a publicly available database of trade shipments and confirmed
the shipments were coming from China.1 8 6 Reade also obtained a
sample of the mislabeled product and confirmed that an ingredient
present in the powder, silicon, was typical of magnesium powder
manufactured in China.' 8 7
Reade filed a complaint under the civil FCA alleging contract and
import fraud by its competitor.1" Reade alleged that by falsely
describing the ultra-fine magnesium as "magnesium desulphurization
reagent," Reade's competitors paid a 5% import duty, rather than the
305.56% duty applicable to "ultra-fine" magnesium powder imported
from China.' The United States intervened.' 90 The defendants settled
for $8 million.' 9 ' In a parallel criminal prosecution, five former
employees and agents of Reade's competitor pled guilty to related
charges.' 92 One of.the defendants, the former President of one of the
companies involved, agreed to pay more than $14 million in
182 Id. In addition, the U.S. Dep't of Commerce has issued an anti-dumping order
subjecting ultra-fine magnesium power imported from China to a duty of 305.56%. Id T21.
183 Id, ¶28.
184 Id.
185 Id.

32.

186 Id
187 Id.

¶ 35.
¶ 36.

188 Id
189 Id.

¶ 70.
190 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tennessee and New York-Based Defense
Contractors Agree to Pay $8 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Involving
Defective Countermeasure Flares Sold to the U.S. Army (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/tennessee-and-new-york-based-defense-contractors-agree-pay-8million-settle-false-claims-act.
191 Id.

192 Id See also Magness, supra note 50.
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Reade received $400,000 as relator's share of the

94

The Reade case demonstrates an important point. When businesses
and individuals misrepresent the country of origin for the purpose of
qualifying goods for sale to the federal government, they violate one
provision of the civil FCA. 9s In addition, as demonstrated in the Reade
case, they may well violate another provision of the FCAl 96 if they are
falsifying the country of origin at the time goods are imported.
Falsifications at the point of entry into the United States will certainly
help conceal the true source of goods when the goods are later sold to
the U.S. government. It is reasonable to think that many companies that
falsely represent to the U.S. government that their goods comply with
"made in America" requirements, begin their fraud at the time such
goods are imported. Given this reality, it is surprising how few
contracting fraud cases brought by the Department of Justice and
relators under FCA provisions. do not allege and prove all FCA
violations being committed. Prosecutors and relators may well be
"leaving money on the table" by not investigating and including import
fraud when investigating and charging contracting fraud cases.1 97 For
the same reason, corporate counsel should ensure that clients who sell
goods to the federal government, and who are in the supply chain of
such goods, are not at risk of liability for import fraud under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(G). Businesses involved in any aspect of "port to point of
sale" of goods sold to the federal government may well have liability

Press Release, supra note 190.
Id.
195 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). As an aside, when
this section is violated, § 3729(a)(1)(B) may also be violated. Section 3729(a)(1)(B) creates
liability for using or causing to be used a false record or material statement to a false claim.
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 174; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Telecommunications Firm to Pay Us $1 Million to Settle Alleged Violations of the Trade
Agreements Act (July 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telecommunications-firmpay-us-1-million-settle-alleged-violations-trade-agreements-act
(Appendix A,
#27);
Furniture by Thurston, supra note 171.
196 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (known as the
"reverse" false claims act provision).
197 Scutellaro, supra note 4 is an example where both types of fraud appear to be present
but only contracting fraud was alleged in the complaint. The complaint in this case alleged
that "large quantities" of "lighting products were being shipped from China to the United
States" but bore the insignia "Made in China." This allegation would indicate that there was
evidence of import fraud as well as contracting fraud as a result of misrepresentations about
the country of origin. Id.
193

194
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under the FCA for import fraud committed by their importers given the
FCA's "reckless disregard" mens rea requirement.' 9 8 Prices "too good
to be true" probably are. Ignoring suspicious pricing, coupled with
sloppy import protocol, may well be enough to subject all companies
in the supply chain of products sold to the U.S. government to liability
under the civil FCA for import fraud. Corporate compliance plans
should include training to businesses that sell products to the federal
government about their potential "downstream" import fraud and
liability. Effective corporate compliance plans should include systems
for detecting import fraud that may be occurring within the client's
business or affiliated businesses.
IV
THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHY IT IS A POTENT WEAPON
AGAINST TRADE FRAUD

"[The False Claims Act] creates market place incentives to
encourage the private sector to do the public's work."'99

As noted supra, 200 all of the civil trade fraud cases brought by the
U.S. Department of Justice from 2000 to 2016 have been under the civil
FCA. The FCA is a unique statute. The FCA creates an unusual
partnership between law enforcement and private individuals. Heralded
for decades as the premier tool to fight white collar crime,20' the FCA
is well-designed for the complexities of trade fraud. This Section
explains what the FCA is and how it applies to trade fraud.
Experience has shown that the civil FCA is effective in fighting
fraud in heavily regulated fields such as healthcare, 2 0 2 defense
198 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
199 Interview by the Corporate Crime Reporter with John R. Phillips (Nov. 9, 1987)
[hereinafter Phillips Interview]. Phillips is generally credited with passage of the 1986
Amendments, which revitalized the FCA. In this interview, Phillips discusses how the 1986
Amendments came about, and how they changed dynamics within the United States
Department of Justice and within industries relevant to FCA liability. Id
200 See supra Chart 2; see also Appendix A.
201 "[T]he False Claims Act . . has been the Department's primary civil enforcement
tool to combat fraud. . . ." HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigrationand Claims of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14 (1998) (testimony of Donald K. Stem, U.S.
Att'y, Dist. Mass. and Chair, Att'y Gen.'s Advisory Comm., U.S. Dep't of J.).
202 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7
Billion From False Claim Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fis
cal-year-2016 ("[The] vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions more in losses
by deterring others who might otherwise try to cheat the system for their own gain."); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud
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contracting,203
and environmental regulation.204 The FCA's
effectiveness is due, in large part, to the public-private partnership it
creates between individuals, known as qui tam relators, and the U.S.
Department of Justice. As the FCA has shown, where complex and
multi-layered transactions are standard fare, guidance from industry
insiders such as relators as to whether fraud is occurring, who is
committing it, and what evidence exists, is invaluable. 2 05 The evolution
of the FCA in the healthcare field is telling. In 1987, the first year after
the FCA was amended and thereby galvanized as a fraud-fighting tool,
there were only three FCA relator cases involving health care fraud and
zero dollars realized in recoveries from such cases. In 2016, four
decades later, there were 501 such cases and $2.499 billion realized in
recoveries from healthcare FCA cases.206 Only recently has the FCA
been used to combat trade fraud.207 This Part discusses how the FCA
works and how its unique partnering of individuals, private attorneys,
and law enforcement20 8 is as well-suited to the complexities of trade

Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-largest-health-care-fraud-settlement-its-history (stating that Pfizer
agreed to pay $2.3 billion for violation of the FCA); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and
Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmith
(stating
kline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report
the $3 billion plea deal is the largest health care fraud settlement in the history of the FCA).
203 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Files and
Simultaneously Settles False Claims Act Lawsuit Against Defense Contractor And Its
President For Multi-Year Fraud Involving Sale of Defective Weapons Sights to U.S.
Military And Other Agencies (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr
/manhattan-us-attorney-files-and-simultaneously-settles-false-claims-act-lawsuit-against
(stating that over $25 million was recovered from a defense contractor for falsifying weapon
sight information and violating the FCA).
204 See Consent Decree, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deep Water Horizon" in the Gulf
of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 18-30 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.justice
.gov/enrd/file/838066/download (summarizing, in part, the application of the FCA to BP
company after the Deepwater Horizon incident based on its false reports of drilling margins)
The consent decree ordered a $20 billion payout. Id
205 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940-47 (discussing how the FCA
provides regulators with much needed inside information about fraud and other wrongdoing
in society).
206 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fraud Statistics - Health and Human Services
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/91836 1/download. Relators
recovered over $450.5 million from these cases. Id
207 See supra Chart 1 & Chart 2.
208 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False
Claims Act, 31 FL. ST. U. LAW REv. 603, 606-607 (2004) [hereinafter Games and Stories];
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fraud as it is to healthcare or other complex frauds against the
government.
A. History of the FCA: Diseased Mules and Defective Muskets
Frustrated that diseased mules and defective muskets were being
delivered to Union troops by government contractors, President
Abraham Lincoln urged the passage of the FCA in 1863.209 It was
quickly passed by Congress in a very similar form to the current
FCA. 2 1 0 The FCA has been amended several times since, 2 1 1 Most
dramatically in 1986.212 The FCA grows out of a long tradition of using
private parties to supplement law enforcement efforts.2 13 One court

Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53-54, 61-62 (2002) [hereinafter
PrivateJustice].
209 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman).
According to the 1863 investigation, one thousand mules delivered to the Union army were
"unfit for the service, and almost worthless, for being too old or too young, blind, weakeyed, damaged, worn out or diseased .....
Id. See also False Claims Act Amendments:
Hearings on H.R. 3334 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov't Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986); The History and Development of Qui Tam,
1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 81 (1972); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English
EradicationofQui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C.L. REV. 539 (2000).
210 The original FCA contained both criminal and civil penalties for its violation. Act to

&

Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 69698 (1863). In 1874, the criminal and civil provisions were separately codified. REV. STAT.
3490-94 and 5438 (1875). The civil FCA is now found at 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-31 (Lexis
through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The criminal provisions are found in 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 286,
287, 1001, 1002 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Significant amendments in 1986
changed the qui tam provisions of the statute, see supra note 166.
211 REV. STAT. 3490-94 and 5438 (1875); 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (daily ed. Sept. 17,
1943); False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986);
Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1362; Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (clarifying parts of3l U.S.C. §§ 3729
3731).
212 False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
The 1986 Amendments are credited with revitalizing the FCA, which had fallen into disuse.
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND

QUI

TAM ACTIONS

§

1.04[H] (Wolters Kluwer

2017) (1993). The 1986 Amendments increased the amount of recovery a private party who
brought an FCA action (termed a "relator") could receive; guaranteed a minimum amount
of recovery for the relator; relaxed the "jurisdictional bar" provisions which had prevented
many relators from filing suit; clarified and relaxed the mens rea requirement; expanded the
statute of limitations; clarified the burden of proof; and added protection for whistleblowers
who are retaliated against by their employers. PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 47-48.
213 Known as "informer" actions, law suits that use private parties to supplement law
enforcement efforts, termed "informer" actions, were common in thirteenth century England
and colonial America. See Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 909-17. These
early actions provided for minimal, if any, oversight of "informers" and were subject to
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explained that the FCA operates on the theory "that one of the least
expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the
treasury is to make the perpetrators . . . liable to actions by private
persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the
hope of gain."2 14
The FCA remained relatively dormant until amendments in 1986
invigorated the role of private parties, known as "qui tam relators."2 15
"Qui tam" comes from the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur" which means "he who pursues
this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own."2 16 Under
the "qui tam" provisions, any person, not just the party injured by the
alleged conduct, may file an action under the FCA. 2 17 This plaintiff,
known as a "relator," is deemed to have standing on the theory that the
federal government is the injured party and may assign its right to sue
under the FCA. 2 18 Eyeing the success of the invigorated 1986 FCA,
thirty states and a number of municipalities have passed their own
FCAs covering false claims submitted to state governments.219
many abuses. By the mid-twentieth century, they had been abolished in England and fell
into disuse in America. Id.; Beck, supra note 209.
214 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885). See also United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n. 5 (1943) (quoting Griswold with approval);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997).
215 PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 48-49.
216 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n. 1
(2000). See also The History and Development of Qui Tam, WASH. U. L. Q. 81, 83 (1972)
citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1st ed. 1768).

217 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
218 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, the Supreme Court held "that adequate
basis for the relator's suit . . . is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim." Vt. Agency
of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 765, 773. See also 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub.
L. No. 115-140).
219 State False Claims Act, TAF EDUC. FUND., https://taf.org/Public/Resources by
Topic/FAC _False ClaimsAct/StateFCAs/Public/Resources byTopic/FCAFalse
(listing
ClaimsAct/StateFCA-s.aspxhkey-a0879c08-1539-44f6-8b51-f8aed240c448
of all states and municipalities with FCA statutes); see James F. Barger, Jr., Pamela H. Bucy,
Melinda M. Eubanks & Marc S. Raspanti, States, Statutes and Fraud:An EmpiricalStudy
ofEmergingState FalseClaims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REv. 465 (2005) (discussing and evaluating
state FCA statutes). These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington. Additionally, the District of Colombia and several notable cities
such as Chicago and New York have statutes modeled after the FCA. Id. See The 1986 False
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B. How Does the FCA Work?
The FCA prohibits seven types of conduct, all. of which pertain to
the submission of false or fraudulent claims to the U.S. government. 2 20
The FCA covers any person who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D),
(E), (F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes
to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
property; or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government ....
Liability under the FCA attaches only if conduct is committed
"knowingly." The FCA defines knowingly as "actual knowledge" or
conduct committed with "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard"
of the truth or falsity of the claim submitted.22 2 Liability under the FCA
attaches only if the falsity is material to the claim. 223 The FCA defines
materiality as "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of

Claims

Amendment

Act,

TAXPAYERS

AGAINST

FRAUD

EDUC.

FUND,

http://taf.org/public/drupal/TAF-fca-25anniversary_12%281`%29.pdf (last visited May 17,
2017).
220 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
221 Id
222 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
223 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(b)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property."224 Each
violation of the FCA carries a mandatory penalty of between $11,000
and $21,563 per false claim, 22 5 as well as treble damages, 226 and
attorneys' fees and costs. 22 7 Cooperation and disclosure to the U.S.
Department of Justice are rewarded. If a party discloses to the U.S.
government all information about false claims it has submitted to the
government and cooperates with the government, then no penalties will
be assessed and damages are reduced from treble to double.228
However, this disclosure must be prior to the commencement of any
action by the government against the person for the fraud at issue.229
All trade fraud falls under § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the FCA, known as the
"reverse false claim" section. This provision creates liability for any
person who "knowingly conceals or knowing and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government." Misrepresentations about the nature of goods or the
country of origin of goods imported to avoid or minimize import duties

fall within § 3729(a)(1)(G).
U.S. Customs Form 7501 is the starting point to determine if trade
fraud has been committed. Every importer must file a U.S. Customs
Form 7501 with each shipment of goods brought into the United
States.230 As discussed above,23 ' all trade fraud falls into two general
types of false claims or statements under the FCA. Both types of fraud
will arise from false statements and claims made on U.S. Customs
Form 7501. Box 28 (description of merchandise),2 32 Box 32 (value),233
and Box 33 (dutiable rate) 234 will be false when importers misrepresent
the nature of the product they are importing. Box 10 (country of

224 Id See also Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1996 (2016).
225 See Department of Labor Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Catch-Up
Adjustment, 81 Fed. Reg. 43429, 43430 (July 1, 2016).
226 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
227 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3730(d)(1)-(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
228 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
229 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
230 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ENTRY

SUMMARY (CBP FORM 7501) [hereinafter CBP FORM 7501].
231 See supra Chart 2 and text accompanying notes 57-153.
232 CBP FORM 7501, supra note 230.
233

Id

234 Id
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origin)2 35 and Box 33 (dutiable rate)2 36 will be false when defendants
misrepresent the country of origin. Box 26 (importer of record) 237 is the
likely defendant. Depending on the knowledge, or reckless disregard
of facts, additional defendants may include individuals and businesses
that handled shipping, wholesaling, retailing, or sales service of the
imported goods.238
Although the fraud itself may be difficult to detect and prove, use of
the FCA to pursue trade fraud is simple and straightforward. Every
false statement or claim made by an importer will be on Form 7501.
With trade fraud, there is no need to delve into "implied certification"
analysis. 23 9 Nor will materiality be a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in
trade fraud cases-as is often true in other uses of the FCA. Materiality
"look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of
the alleged misrepresentation." 24 0 Therefore, the accuracy or falsity of
information provided to CBP on Form 7501, which is directly utilized
in calculating the appropriate duties to be paid, is material because that
information is determinative of Customs' assessment of money owed
to the government.
Id.
Id.
237 Id
238 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See supra text
accompanying notes 193-96.
239 The "Implied Certification" analysis is a body of False Claims Act case law that has
been developed addressing a theory of False Claims Act liability "commonly referred to as
implied false certification." Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 1995. "According to
this theory, when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance with all
conditions of payment. But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant's violation of a
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the theory goes, the defendant
has made a misrepresentation that renders the claim "false or fraudulent" under §
3729(a)(1)(A)." Id. (Universal Health Services was denoted as an "implied false
certification" case because it was alleged Defendants defrauded the Medicaid program by
submitting reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific mental health
services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious
violations of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and
licensing requirements for these services and therefore such services were actually provided
by nurses and not physicians.) In UniversalHealth Services, Inc., the Court approved of the
basis of liability colloquially referred to as "implied certification theory" and in doing so
eliminated the distinction of the legal fiction of "implied certification" vs. "express
certification" (circumstances in which a defendant is alleged to submitted a claim that is
false because it expressly certifies compliance with a statute or regulation yet fails to meet
the requirements of that statute or regulation). The Court provided that the determinative
factor-in any type of False Claims Act case-is that a misrepresentation about compliance
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the
Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. Id
235

236

240 Id.
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C. Procedure Under the FCA
The procedure under the FCA is unique. Relators initiate FCA
actions by filing the case in the name of the U.S. government as well
as in their own name.24 ' The style of an FCA case brought by a relator
is titled United States ex rel. [name of relator] v. [defendant]. Relators
are required to file their complaints under seal, not serving it on a
defendant, and provide a copy of their complaint to the U.S.
Department of Justice along with a written report of "all material
evidence and information" the relator possesses.242 The relator's
complaint remains under seal, often for months or even years, to allow
the Department of Justice an opportunity to investigate the charges
made by the relator. 243 The secrecy provided by the sealed complaint
protects a defendant's reputation if the relator's information amounts
to nothing, 244 as well as facilitates the Department of Justice's
investigation of the relator's information.24 5
After investigating the matter, the Department of Justice determines
whether it will intervene in the relator's case.246 Often when it
intervenes, the Department of Justice amends the relator's complaint
based upon its own investigation.24 7 After intervention, the Department

241 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
242 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Not only does the
FCA require that relators provide DOJ with all information they have pertaining to an FCA
case prior to filing the complaint, it is to relators' advantage to disclose full information to
DOJ filing a complaint. Id. As a strategic matter doing so helps overcome potential hurdles.
Id. Relators have a greater chance of qualifying as an "original source" and thus overcoming
jurisdictional bar issues. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(e) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Early
and full disclosure also helps demonstrate they are "first to file," thus solidifying their right
to bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
243 ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 33 (2000).

244 PrivateJustice, supranote 208, at 69-70.
245 Phillips Interview, supra note 199; WEST, supra note 243, at 33; Sen. Rep. 99-345,
99th Cong. 2 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5281.
246 A unique investigative avenue available to the Department of Justice in FCA cases is
the "civil investigative demand," or "CID." 31 U.S.C.S. § 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No.
115-140). This investigatory tool allows the Department of Justice authority to demand
documents, compel answers to interrogatories, and obtain oral testimony. CIDs can be
extremely powerful prosecutorial tools. See, e.g., PrivateJustice, supra note 208; PAMELA
H. Bucy, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ch. 6 (LJSP 2001)

(discussing the investigation of health care fraud cases).
247 The Department of Justice amends most complaints filed by relators because of the
additional information the Department gathers with the more extensive investigatory tools
it has at its disposal compared to the investigative resources available to qui tam relators.
For a discussion of these resources, see PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 51 n. 291.
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of Justice sometimes handles the entire case,248 in other cases, the
Department of Justice works hand-in-hand with relators sharing
investigative and litigation duties.249
If the Department of Justice declines to intervene in the relator's
case, then a relator may pursue the case alone. 25 0 Historically, the
Department of Justice has intervened in less than twenty-five percent
of cases filed by relators, 251 and relators who proceeded on their own
after the Department of Justice declined to intervene as a plaintiff have
enjoyed little success.2 52 These cases are dismissed more frequently and
the recoveries are substantially less.253 In the event the Department of
Justice does not join a relator's case, the Department of Justice may
monitor the case and intervene at any time, even for limited purposes,
such as appeal.254
Regardless of whether or not it intervenes, the Department of Justice
retains authority to settle or dismiss a relator's suit-although the
relator is given an opportunity in court to be heard before the case is
settled or dismissed. 255 The Department of Justice also retains authority

248 If the Department of Justice intervenes in the case as a relator, it assumes "primary
responsibility" for the case although the relator remains as a plaintiff and is guaranteed a
participatory role. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
249 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001); United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (facts more fully discussed in United States ex rel. Merena v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev'd 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir.
2000)).
250 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
251 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

IN QuI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS 2, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaoedpa/legacy/2011/04/18/fcaprocess2 0.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017).
252 PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 51-52.
253 In 2016, for example, realtors' awards in cases in which the Department of Justice
intervened totaled $2.8 billion, while total relator recovery in cases in which the Department
of Justice declined to intervene totaled $104.98 million. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Fraud Statistics-Overview (Dec. 13, 2016), https://wwwjustice.gov /opa/pressrelease/file/918361/download.
254 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See, e.g., Vt. Agency
of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000); United States ex rel.
Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2001).
255 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(2)(A)B) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). DOJ may
move for dismissal or oppose a settlement without intervening. See, e.g., Juliano v. Fed.
Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (DOJ moved to dismiss
relator's case after declining to intervene.); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207
F.3d 335, 340-41 (6th Cir. 2000) (After declining to intervene, DOJ opposed the settlement
reached by relator and defendant.).
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to seek limitations on the relator's involvement in the case 2 56 and to
seek alternative remedies, such as administrative sanctions, in lieu of
the relator's lawsuit. 25 7 Some circuits have held that the Department of
Justice retains authority to veto any settlement reached by the
defendants and the relators.2 58
Only relators who are "first to file" are eligible to receive a share of
any judgment recovered 2 59 and, while the statute guarantees relators
between 15% and 30% of a judgment,260 the actual award within this
statutory range depends upon the relator's helpfulness to the
government in pursuing the case. 26' Judgments under the FCA have
been large, some as large as $2.4 billion, $1.4 billion, $540 million and
$325 million. 2 62 Relators' awards have also been large. In 2016, for
example, relators received awards of $98 million, $84 million, and $51
million.263
D. Why the FCA Is Effective in Fighting Fraud
For four reasons, the FCA has proven extraordinarily successful in
combatting fraud against the federal government. First, because of its
ability to enlist the help of private persons who have information about
ongoing fraud, the FCA brings otherwise unknown information about
fraud to law enforcement's attention. Second, the FCA's unique
partnering of private individuals, private counsel, and government

256 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
257 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
258 United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330, 333 (4th
Cir. 2017).
259 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(5) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). See BOESE, supra
note 212, at § 4.03(C)(2).
260 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140). If the DOJ joins the
relator's case, the relator is guaranteed at least fifteen percent and up to twenty-five percent
of any judgment or settlement. If the DOJ does not join the relator's case, the relator is
guaranteed twenty-five percent to thirty percent of the judgment or settlement. The award
to the relator, which must be approved by the court "depends on the extent to which the
person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action." Id.
261 For example, a relator's case cannot proceed, and is "jurisdictionally barred," if the
information brought to the DOJ by the relator was already public, unless the relator is the
"original source" of the information and the relator disclosed the information to the
government. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(e)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
262 FY 2009 False Claims Act Settlements, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND,

http://www.taf.org/total2009.htm (last visited May 18, 2017).
263 Top 15 FCA Cases of 2016, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND (Oct. 26,
2016), http://www.taf.orgiblog/top-15-fca-cases-2016.
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authorities supplements limited law enforcement litigative resources.
Third, as a "punitive" civil cause of action, the FCA's treble damages
and mandatory monetary penalties deter future wrongdoing by
businesses as effectively as a criminal prosecution, but without the
difficulty and expense of a criminal investigation or trial. Fourth, the
FCA has demonstrated effectiveness in policing heavily regulated
industries undergoing policy debate.264
1. The FCA Provides the Resource ofInside Information
Complex economic activity is buried in electronic and paper trails,
concealed in false statements, disguised in layers of organizations, and
hidden in complex financial transactions. Multiple individuals, offices,
divisions, companies, and countries, are likely to have participated in
some stage of a fraud.2 65 Because few individuals are foolish enough,
careless enough, or bold enough to submit false claims without creating
complex cover-ups, there is always concealment. For example, when a
healthcare provider submits claims to Medicare for services not
performed, patient files have likely been falsified to corroborate the
fraudulent claim.2 6 6 When quality control tests have been altered, or are
not performed, records likely have been falsified to reflect that such
tests were performed to reflect (falsely) and that the product met
specifications.26 7 If importers engage in fraud to avoid paying import
duties, there will be false shipping manifests, customs declarations, and
product labels.2 68 There may be diversionary shipping routes spanning
the globe. Every fraud is hard to penetrate. Trade fraud is even harder.
Information from those inside the business committing the fraud is
essential for law enforcement to know what is going on and who is
doing it.
For these reasons, fraud cannot be effectively detected or deterred
without the help of those who are intimately familiar with it.269 Insiders
264 See PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 53-54.
265 Informationas a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940.
266 Pamela Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated
Crime: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Health Care FraudProsecutions,63 FORDHAM L. REV.
383, 434-37 (1994).
267 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (3d Cir.
2002).
268 See, e.g., Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6, at 16-19.
269 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care
Providers, 67 N. C. L. REV. 855, 871-81 (1989); Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of
InvestigatingandProsecutingWhite Collar Crime, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 405,406-13 (1993);
John C. Jeffries & John Gleeson, The Federalizationof Organized Crime: Advantages of
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know what has happened, who is to blame, and where evidence is
located, and their participation is essential.27 0 Insiders know what is
fake and what is real. They can explain customs and habits of the
business or industry, direct investigators to evidence of fraud, interpret
evidence, and provide industry expertise. 271 Information about fraud
from an industry insider is sometimes the only way to alert the
government and the public to the wrongdoing that is occurring. Without
insiders, fraud may not be apparent, perhaps for years. By then much
harm may have been done and evidence to prove what happened may
have disappeared. An insider's early warning can prevent harm to
unaware victims and enable law enforcement to take timely action. As
law enforcement officials who have worked with relators explain,
"[w]histleblowers are essential to our operation. Without them, we
wouldn't have cases." 27 2
The FCA's relator provisions provide both an incentive for
individuals with information about fraud to come forward, and a
mechanism to do so. Historically, relators have been employees and
former employees of defendants. They have also been competitors of
defendants. 2 73 This is not surprising. Employees are the first to see or
discover that fraud is being committed. Competitors are often the first
hurt by other businesses' fraud. These groups have a "bird's eye" view
of fraud and the harm it inflicts. As one seasoned prosecutor said when

Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103-17 (1995); William H. Webster, An
Examination ofFBI Theory and Methodology Regarding White-Collar Crime Investigation
and Prevention, 17 AM. CR. L. REv. 275, 276-77 (1980); Hearing Before Subcomm. on
General Oversight and Investigation of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 105th
Cong. 16 (1998) (testimony of William F. Baity, Acting Director, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network); Medicare at Risk: Emerging Fraud in Medicare Programs:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Investigations ofthe S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
GovernmentalAffairs, 105th Cong. 126-35 (1997) (Prepared Statement of Pamela H. Bucy).
270 PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 60-62; Games andStories, supra note 208, at 61416.
271 Information as a Commodity, supra note 30, at 940-41.
272 Justin Gillis, Whistleblowing: What PriceAmong Scientists?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28,
1995, at A21 (quoting Lawrence J. Rhoades, a division director at the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, which polices federal health research for scientific
misconduct). See also Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act that Impact
Hospitals:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1998) (statement by Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General
for Legal Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (indicating that the FCA,
a purpose of which is to encourage whistleblowing, has been an essential tool in combating
fraud).
273 See BOESE, supranote 212, at §§ 4.01(B)(lH3).
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announcing a multi-million-dollar settlement of an FCA trade fraud
case brought by a relator:
This case is an excellent example of the essential public service a
whistle-blower can perform by partnering with the government to
expose illegal conduct that adversely affects the public fisc.274
Our review of trade fraud cases pursued by Department of Justice
from 2000 to 2016 shows that relators come from three groups:
competitors, employees or former employees of defendants, and
industry insiders.275 The largest group of relators are competitors of
defendants. These businesses have been most immediately and
dramatically impacted by a defendant's dishonesty. They have lost
customers and contracts to defendants that underpriced them by
cheating on import duties. Relators in trade fraud cases have also been
employees of defendants, many of whom lost or quit their jobs after
alerting supervisors, in vain, of ongoing import fraud within the
company. A few of the relators in trade fraud cases have been industry
insiders: individuals who had enough knowledge of the field to spot
those who were engaging in import fraud.
2. The FCA Supplements DOJ Resources
The FCA creates a mechanism not only for relators to provide
information about fraud to federal agencies but also a way for relators'
counsel to work with Department of Justice attorneys and federal
agents and thereby supplement the Department of Justice's litigative
resources. By including the relator as a co-plaintiff with the Department
of Justice, the FCA creates a working partnership between relators,
their attorneys, and government prosecutors and agents. 276 This coplaintiff relationship is unique. While there are a number of statutes
that create mechanisms for individuals to provide information of
wrongdoing to law enforcement authorities and receive monetary
compensation for doing so,277 no other statute creates a structure for a
whistleblower to proceed as co-plaintiff with the federal government
or share in the litigative duties on the case.278
274 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Settles Civil Fraud
Lawsuit Against Jewelry Companies Engaged in a Decade-Long Customs Fraud Scheme
(Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/Augustl I/noble
jewelrysettlementpr.pdf.
275 See generally Appendix A.
276 See, e.g., Games and Stories, supra note 208, at 608-19.
277 See PrivateJustice, supra note 208.
278 Id.

at 61-62.
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The FCA crafts this unusual partnership by giving the Department
of Justice and the relator certain rights. It preserves the Department of
Justice's guidance on the case, control of precedent, and direction of
Department of Justice policy by requiring that relators present their
information to the Department of Justice prior to filing a complaint and
under seal.279 These steps allow the Department of Justice the
opportunity to investigate a relator's information before the case
proceeds further and before the allegations become public.2 80 Such a
protocol helps ensure that a case is meritorious, that the Department of
Justice's initiatives are not disrupted, and that innocent defendants'
reputations are not tarnished.28 ' The FCA gives the Department of
Justice "primary responsibility" for the case, including authority to
amend the complaint, oppose certain actions by a relator, and petition
the court for limitations on the relator's role.282
The FCA also preserves certain rights for the relator by guaranteeing
the relator a minimum share in any recovery,283 requiring that the
Department of Justice notify the relator about government decisions in
1
the case, 284 giving te
the relator
the opportunity to be heard on dismissal
2 85
the right to proceed in the case as co-plaintiff if the
or settlement,
government intervenes, and the right to continue the case as sole
plaintiff if the government does not intervene.2 86
Trade fraud cases brought by relators demonstrate the level of
assistance knowledgeable relators and experienced relators' counsel
can provide to the Department of Justice. Relators have discovered fake
"factories" in India,287 volatile magnesium being imported under false
label (as a more stable and safe magnesium product), 288 fake drugs, 2 89
counterfeit computer equipment, 2 90 and products misdescribed to avoid
paying import duties.291 Qui tam relators have purchased dishonest
279
280
281
282
283
284

31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
31 U.S.C.S. § 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
Games andStories, supra note 208, at 609-10.
31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(d) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).

285 Id.

286
287
288
289
290
291

31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c)(3) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6.
Reade Mfg. Co., supra note 27.
Giddens, supra note 9.
Cone, supra note 76.
Nguyen, supra note 54.
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competitors' products and tested them, confirming ingredients from
disallowed countries.2 92 Relators have used their knowledge of
shipping patterns within industries to trace false shipping routes and
routes designed to disguise the true country of origin.293 Relators have
provided computer hard drives showing fraud,294 incriminating
statements of defendants,295 false records,2 96 and accurate records 29 7
that dispute the false records. Relators have provided names of
corroborating and knowledgeable witnesses.29 8 In every trade fraud
case brought by relators, the relators were the first to detect fraud. They
have saved the U.S. Treasury millions of dollars, protected the
marketplace from corruption, and consumers from unsafe products.
3. The FCA Provides an Effective "Middle Ground" Between
CriminalProsecutionand Civil Liability
Criminal prosecution of wrongdoers carries a "big bang for the
buck." Nothing gets the attention of wrongdoers more than an
indictment or a "perp walk." However, criminal prosecutions are
difficult, time-consuming, and resource intensive. 299 They should be.
The U.S. Constitution provides criminal defendants with rights not
granted to defendants in civil cases, including the right to a grand jury
finding of probable cause,300 assistance of counsel,3 0 ' confrontation of
witnesses, 3 02 speedy trial, 303 and unanimous verdict. 3 1 Criminal
convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of

292 Scutellaro, supra note 4.
293 Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6.
294 Simmons, supra note 174.
295 Jimenez, supra note 1.
296 In every trade fraud case, false statements appear on U.S. Customs Form 7501. See
supratext accompanying notes 231-38.
297 See, e.g., Graphite Electrode Sales, supra note 6. The relator in this case used its
knowledge of the industry to research the Port Import/Export Reporting Service (PIERS)
database to confirm that the defendant had imported goods from China through India as part
of the defendant's fraudulent conduct of concealing China as the true source of its goods.
298 Wells, supra note 59.
299 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate CriminalLiability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1437, 1437 (criminal prosecution "is the most potent regulatory mechanism
society possesses.").
300 See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI.
301 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
302 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
303 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
304 See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §22.1(e) (4th ed. 2016).
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an offense305 and proof of specific intent to break the law.306 The burden
of proof required in criminal cases is hard to meet, especially when
complex transactions are at issue and misunderstandings of the law
create a legal defense. 3 0 7
For many crimes, criminal prosecution is the only way to protect the
public from perpetrators other than through criminal prosecution.
However, for white-collar frauds against the government, this is not
true. Every fraud against the federal government is also a civil cause of
action under the FCA and thus a civil lawsuit under the FCA provides
an effective alternative to criminal prosecution. 30 s The FCA's stiff
penalties, treble damages, and heightened mens rea requirement carry
a "big bang for the buck," and can deter future wrongdoing
effectively.30 9 However, because the FCA is a civil action and not a
criminal prosecution, FCA cases are easier to bring and win than
criminal prosecutions. They are a cost-efficient, effective way to deter
trade fraud.

305 See LAFAVE, supra note 304, at

§ 26.4(h).

306 Id.

307 PrivateJustice, supra note 208, at 3-4.
308 Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1802 (1992). See also BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES
AND MATERIALS 236 (West Academic 2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinctionin American Law, 71
B. U. L. REv. 193, 202-08 (1991); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporateand White Collar Crime:
Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 391, 391 (1994).
309 See IBM Will Pay the U.S. $14.8 Million to Settle False Claims Charge, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1993, at C 15; Peter Loftus, CorporateNews: Judge OrdersJ&J to Pay $1.2 Billion,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2012, at B3; Teledyne Settles U.S. Suit, Agrees to Pay $2.15 Million,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1993, at A4; Vauhini Vara, Oracle Agrees to Pay $98.5 Million to
Settle Suit Over GSA Contracts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, at B3.
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4. The FCA Promotes Effective Regulation in Industries that Are
Undergoing Significant Policy Debate
The FCA is also very effective at fighting fraud in an industry
undergoing significant public policy disagreement. Instead, the
information about fraud which the FCA brings forth helps shed light
on systemic changes that can be made within the industry to discourage
and prevent fraud.
For example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs have been
subject to constant, vigorous debate on multiple fronts since they were
enacted.3 10 However, throughout these ongoing disagreements on
fundamental public policy issues involving these programs, the FCA
has been deployed consistently and successfully to combat fraud by the
wide variety of healthcare providers. The ongoing policy debates have
not detracted from the FCA's ability to combat fraud in these programs.
Rather, FCA cases identifying fraud in governmental healthcare
programs have helped identify aspects of these programs that could and
should be changed to reduce fraud, save taxpayers money that was
being diverted to fraud, improve the programs, and enhance patient
care. 311

The FCA can serve the same role regarding trade fraud. There are
many similarities between health care fraud and trade fraud. Both are
heavily regulated. In both, there is significant financial incentive to
commit fraud and endless ability to conceal it. Although health care
fraud involves payments from the federal government for medical
services and trade fraud involves payments due to the United States as
import duties and tariffs, both types of fraud are explicitly covered by
the FCA.312 The government payment structure in the healthcare field
is based on an elaborate scaffolding of government regulations and
310 See 141 CONG. REC. E1868 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brian
Bilbray); 141 CONG. REC. H10333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1995); Saving Medicare, Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 4, 37-58 (1995); 149 CONG. REC.
S 15927-29 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003).
311 See 147 CONG. REC. S1008 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley);
Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act That Impact Hospitals, HearingBefore
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1525, 44 (1998) (statement of Lewis Morris Ass. Inspector General for Legal Affairs, Office
of Inspector General) (summarizing problems with fraud in Health Care and suggesting that
FCA audits improve the systems); Medicaid Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: Threatening the
Health Care Safety Net, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 10-11 (2005)
(statement of James Moorman, President and CEO, Taxpayers Against Fraud).
312 Section 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA pertains to almost all health care fraud, while §
3729(a)(1)(G) pertains to trade fraud. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Lexis through Pub. L.
No. 115-140); 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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administrative procedures. An understanding of this underlying
regulatory system and how it can be manipulated by dishonest
providers is crucial to successful detection, proof, and deterrence of
health care fraud. The duty and tariff system in trade is similarly
constructed upon an elaborate base of government regulation and
administrative procedure. Like healthcare, successful detection and
deterrence of trade fraud depends upon intimate knowledge of how this
trade and tariff system can be manipulated. Within both healthcare and
trade fraud, only insiders have enough access to see that fraud is
occurring, who is doing it, and how to prove it. This is why the FCA,
with its ability to incentivize insiders to come forward and work with
law enforcement, is as ideally suited to fighting trade fraud as it is to
combatting health care fraud.
E. How to Enhance the FCA's Effectiveness as a Weapon Against
Trade Fraud
1. CoordinateFederalLaw Enforcement Efforts
Collaboration between the various federal agencies that have a role
in combatting trade fraud is essential to effectively detecting,
prosecuting, and ultimately deterring trade fraud. To successfully
coordinate the multi-agency efforts directed at trade fraud, the
Department of Justice should utilize the interagency task force model
used successfully for decades by multiple U.S. Attorneys' offices to
combat health care fraud, another type of fraud that by its nature
involves many investigative agencies and expertise.
The primary entities involved in fighting trade fraud are the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI),
both part of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice and its U.S. Attorney Offices, the Department of Commerce and
its International Trade Administration, and the International Trade
Commission. Each of these Departments or Agencies play unique roles
in detecting and prosecuting trade fraud. For example, ICE HSI
investigates a wide array of international crime,3 13 the CBP is the
313 See Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF'T,
https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last updated Aug. 22, 2017) (HSI is a critical investigative arm of
the Department of Homeland Security and is a vital U.S. asset in combating criminal
organizations illegally exploiting America's travel, trade, financial, and immigration
systems.).
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"boots on the ground" at the U.S. borders and has a mission centering
on monitoring the flow of people and items entering the United States
and collecting tariffs and duties.3 14 The Department of Justice is
charged with prosecuting cases, coordinating law enforcement
investigations, evaluating relator FCA actions, and working with
relators on FCA actions."' The DoC, specifically the International
Trade Administration (ITA), and ITC promote specific trade
enforcement initiatives and establish duty classifications, such as
antidumping and countervailing duties.3 16
That so many entities have so many roles and competing
responsibilities regarding trade demonstrates the importance of
coordinating trade fraud efforts for coherent trade policy. This is
especially true with regard to the prosecution of trade fraud where the
stakes are high-for victims as well as putative defendants. Consider
the following scenario. A relator files an FCA complaint in federal
district court alleging that a defendant is perpetrating a scheme to evade
antidumping duties. The complaint should come to the attention of an
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) prior to filing in one of the 94 U.S.
Attorneys' offices. Pursuant to Department of Justice guidelines and
protocols, the AUSA will then communicate with attorneys at the
Department of Justice's Civil Fraud Division in Washington D.C. to
seek guidance and approval to pursue the case.
The AUSA and/or main Department of Justice trial attorneys likely
will contact the International Trade Administration (ITA) within the
DoC since this agency oversees the administration of antidumping
orders. The AUSA will gather information from ITA staff about the
technical aspects of the specific product and the scope of the particular
order to determine if the product at issue in the FCA complaint actually
qualifies under the order. The Department of Justice attorneys will
serve as a liaison between the relator and their counsel to integrate their
knowledge of the alleged fraud into an investigative strategy that will
be implemented by the CBP agents and ICE HSI agents.
314 See About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/about (last
updated Nov. 21, 2016).
315 See Organization, Mission and Function Manual: Civil Division, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-civil
-division (last updated Sept. 9, 2014); see also 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (Lexis through Pub. L.
No. 115-140).
316 See International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
(last
https://www.commerce.gov/doc/international-trade-administration#2/43.4/-112.0
visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also About the USTC, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.usitc.gov/press room/aboutusitc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
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Such coordination likely will require monitoring the imports and
duty rates declared by the defendant and cross-referencing these reports
and facts with the relator's knowledge. More investigation likely will
be needed, quite possibly with the relator's active involvement, which
may include interpreting industry procedures, identifying further
evidence and possible witnesses, and even wearing recording devices
to talk with targets and suspects. The Department of Justice will likely
issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs),317 that are unique to the
FCA investigation requesting pertinent information from the
Defendant. The responses to the CIDs as well as additional evidence
gathered in the ongoing investigation will then be communicated to the
CBP and ICE HSI to further direct the investigation. Ultimately, the
information uncovered will form the basis of the government's decision
whether to intervene in the relator's FCA action, whether to also
criminally prosecute the defendant in a parallel action, or whether the
allegations lack merit.
As can be seen, at all phases of this hypothetical investigation,
communication between the various entities is paramount. This
example demonstrates why collaboration
and established
communication channels among all affected federal agencies is crucial.
Not only would creation of interagency trade fraud task forces facilitate
such communication.and collaboration, it would also help eliminate
redundancies in the learning curve for AUSAs first encountering trade
fraud cases. Additionally, because trade fraud cases can implicate a
number of federal districts and foreign countries, utilizing centralized
task forces, along with specialized training for the Department of
Justice attorneys in such task forces, would further this needed
communication among districts and foreign countries.
Such interagency task forces have been used for years in the area of
health care fraud. These health care fraud task forces have experience
bringing together Department of Justice attorneys, FBI agents, Postal
Inspectors (who have jurisdiction and experience in investigating, mail
fraud and wire fraud schemes), Special Agents with the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), Drug Enforcement Agents and
their state counterparts who investigate pharmacy and other drugrelated provider fraud, Department of Labor, Department of Veterans
Affairs, and other entities as necessary based on the context of a

317 31 U.S.C.S.

§ 3733 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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specific case.3 18 These task forces also integrate the relators who bring
forth information about health care fraud, work with government law
enforcement personnel to further investigate the case when needed, and
through their counsel, often provide significant litigative resources. 3 19
This task force approach has worked well in healthcare and should be
adopted with regard to trade fraud.
2. Dedicate Specialists Within DOJ to Trade Fraud
In addition to encouraging, training, and facilitating individual
USAOs to utilize interagency task forces directed at trade fraud, the
Department of Justice would benefit by better coordinating its
personnel with the "Centers for Excellence" created by the Department
of Homeland Security and the CBP. The international scope of trade
does not comport with the localized structure of the U.S. Attorney

Offices.
The CBP has taken such an approach to combatting trade fraud by
creating "Centers for Excellence and Expertise." These "Centers of
Excellence" focus on certain categories of imported products.3 2 0 For
instance, there is a "Base Metals Center" located in Chicago, Illinois;
an "Apparel, Footwear and Textiles Center" in San Francisco,
California; and a "Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals" center in
New York, New York.3 2 1 In total there are ten Centers of Excellence.
This initiative demonstrates the specific product category approach
necessary to effective trade enforcement.
The Department of Justice should establish a team of attorneys
experienced in trade fraud to be similarly dedicated to specific areas of
trade fraud enforcement. To best integrate with the established and
successful CBP Centers of Excellence, the Department of Justice
should place at least one attorney dedicated to pursuing trade fraud to
be stationed in the U.S. Attorneys' offices where a CBP Center of
Excellence operates who is similarly focused on prosecuting trade
fraud violations related to those product groups. By working directly
with the CBP's subject-matter experts, these Department of Justice

-

318 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, AstraZenica to Pay $7.9 Million to Resolve
Kickback Allegations (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/astrazeneca-pay-79
million-resolve-kickback-allegations; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and
Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmith
kline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report.
319 Id.

320 19 C.F.R. 101.10 (2016).
321 Id.
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trade fraud specialists would gain knowledge of fraud involved with
the importation of particular product groups and be better equipped to
coordinate agency efforts.
Furthermore, by incorporating the Department of Justice into
otherwise routine CBP trade enforcement, the FCA can be utilized
more often to prosecute trade fraud as opposed to CBP regulatory
penalties. By utilizing the FCA instead of Customs' enforcement
remedies, the United States can recover significantly more money from
trade fraud actions and provide greater deterrence from future fraud.322
Whereas Customs fraud statutes provide penalties for "a civil penalty
in an amount not to exceed the domestic value of the merchandise," 323
the FCA mandates treble damages and civil monetary penalties of
$10,957 to $21,916 for each false claim. 32 4
3. Enhance Transparency in ShippingRecords
Making international shipping records more centralized and
transparent would greatly .enhance the ability of private parties,
specifically FCA relators, to investigate and corroborate their
allegations through shipping records prior to filing a trade fraud FCA
action. Enhancing the ability of private parties, specifically putative
FCA relators, to access public, full shipping records would shift
investigatory resources and labor from government investigators to
their private attorney general partners and help fight trade fraud.
The most important set'of records to make more easily accessible to
the public, and thus to potential whistleblowers of trade fraud, is the
Entry Summary, Customs Form 7501.325 This form is not among the
publicly available documents corresponding to an import entry.
However, much of the information corresponding to a shipment is
publicly available, such as importer of record, shipping date, the
disclosed contents of the shipment, the foreign port of lading, the U.S.
port of unlading, and the transport method and vessel. While this "truly
publicly available" information is helpful, it primarily provides
information about the shipping voyage of the imported goods, not what
the importer declares to Customs, such as the declared country of origin
or the declared duties for the shipment. What is declared to the CBP on

322
323
324
325

31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
19 U.S.C.S. § 1592(c)(1) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
CBP FORM 7501, supra note 230.
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Customs Form 7501 is the pertinent information to either confirm or
refute suspicions of trade fraud.
The Department of Homeland Security does allow for the disclosure
of CBP-generated records including the Form 7501 information
necessary to confirm or refute trade fraud suspicions.326 The
information defined as Customs Generated Records includes the "Entry
Number"-which is the CBP-assigned number unique to each Entry
Summary (CBP Form 7501) and the "Entry Type"-and most
important for trade fraud investigations, the sub-entry type-which
"further defines the specific processing type within the entry category
(i.e., -free and dutiable, quota/visa, antidumping/countervailing duty,
and appraisement)."3 27 These two pieces of information are vital to the
identification and corroboration of trade fraud because they identify the
specific Entry Summary to cross-reference with other shipping and
manufacturing details (often supplied by relators), and most
importantly, that identify the rate of duty claimed by the importer-the
evasion of which is the crux of trade fraud.
This needed information is already collected and maintained in an
organized manner by CBP. However, currently, the only way a private
party such as a relator may obtain access to it is through the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) process, which is particularly unsuited for
FCA realtor actions. 32 8 The FOIA process is problematic because it
allows the potential defendant to learn it is being investigated by a
private party and to challenge the disclosure of the information (i.e.,
the potentially incriminating customs submissions). Putative
defendants can prevent the FOIA disclosure by filing a "reverse FOIA"
action against the requesting party.3 29 Thus, for all practical purposes,
utilizing the existing FOIA procedures to obtain relevant data to
prepare a trade fraud FCA complaint simply alerts the potential
defendant that it is being investigated and who is investigating it. By
providing a warning to a potential defendant, the FOIA process allows
now-alerted defendants to alter and better conceal trade fraud to subvert
326 See 80 Fed. Reg. 49256, 49261 (Aug. 17, 2015).
327 See 80 Fed. Reg. 49256, 49259 (Aug. 17, 2015).
328 See id. at 49262.
329 See 19 C.F.R. § 103.35 (2012). "CBP will provide business submitters with prompt
written notice of receipt of FOIA requests or appeals that encompass their commercial
information. The written notice will describe either the exact nature of the commercial
information requested, or enclose copies of the records or those portions of the records that
contain the commercial information. The written notice also will advise the business
submitter of its right to file a disclosure objection statement as provided under paragraph
(c)(1) of this section." Id.
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detection. For these reasons, making the Customs Generated Records,
specifically the information submitted on Customs Form 7501,
available in a public, searchable database that could be accessed
without alerting potential defendant would tremendously enhance the
effectiveness of the FCA as a trade fraud weapon.
Similar publicly searchable databases are utilized in other contexts
of government contracting and claim submission, such as in healthcare.
These databases are invaluable resources to inform the public about the
actions of healthcare providers as well as sources that help relators
corroborate and build their cases to present to the Department of
Justice. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid publishes "Medicare
Provider Utilization and Payment Data" each year.330 This data
provides the billing data, including type of service and frequency, for
every medical provider in the nation that has submitted claims for
payment to Medicare.3 3 ' This billing data is a critical resource for law
enforcement and private parties, including FCA relators, because it
identifies billing outliers, a red flag indicator of fraud. Similarly, the
Affordable Care Act established the "Open Payments" database that
collects and publishes information about drug and device company
payments to physicians and teaching hospitals for expenses like travel,
research, and speaking fees, as well as ownership interests that
physicians and their immediate family have in drug and medical device
companies.3 32 This database has proven to be a vital tool for
investigating potential kickback or Stark Law-related FCA violations.
Establishing a full and open database for trade law claim
submissions should be no different. The collection of appropriate tariffs
and duties is similarly in the interest of public policy. Furthermore, the
success of these important healthcare databases demonstrates why the
potential argument that public disclosure of Customs Form 7501
information violates importers' right to confidential business
information is unconvincing. The publication of the duties actually paid
and country of origin declared is no more confidential than the methods
330 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier,
CENTERS FOR MEDICATE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statis

tics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Phy
sician-and-Other-Supplier.html (last updated June 15, 2017).
331 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier
PUF CY2015, CENTERS FOR MEDICATE

& MEDICAID SERVICES, https://data.cms.gov

/Medicare-Physician-Supplier/Medicare-Provider-Utilization-and-Payment-Data-Phy/sk9b
-znav/data (last visited Aug. 11, 2017).
332 See 78 Fed. Reg. 9458-528 (Feb. 8, 2013).
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and manner by which a physician bills Medicare or the payments made
by a pharmaceutical company to physicians who have ownership
interests in company products or who . are paid to speak on the
company's behalf. Simply put, when private companies' submission of
claims to the government impacts the public fisc and important public
policy issues such as healthcare and trade, the pertinent details of those
claims should be made easily accessible to the public.
4. Maintain More Consistentand CentralizedReporting
Another way to enhance the use of the FCA (as well as criminal
prosecution) as a way to combat trade fraud is to make public
information about trade fraud cases more readily available. Currently,
there is no way to search databases maintained by the U.S.
Administration of Courts, the Department of Justice,333 PACER, or
docket searching systems such as Bloomberg Law to gather
information on criminal or civil trade fraud cases. Case information is
not uniformly collected or stored. There is considerable disparity in the
sophistication, thoroughness, and type of information available in these
databases. For example, the documents currently uploaded to PACER,
and systems such as Bloomberg Law docket search, currently include
scanned copies of docket entries and pleadings that do not use Optical
Character Reading (OCR). Without OCR, a document cannot be
electronically searched or indexed to permit searching within a
document collection. This sharply limits the usefulness of search
systems for finding docket materials, because a search of unindexed
files will only return items that were specifically tagged with particular
keywords. Creating PDFs directly from the original source Word or
WordPerfect documents, or running an OCR program on scanned
documents would make the searches within PACER and docket
333 A significant hurdle when searching DOJ press releases on trade fraud is the lack of
standardization as to where and in what format the press releases are made available. The
DOJ press release database and archive available on DOJ's website included a good number
of press releases, but these two collections were not complete. For example, we examined
press releases available at DOJ's news link, https://www.justice.gov/news websites, as well
as websites separately maintained by the ninety-four individual U.S. Attorney's offices and
found there was no consistent format of the DOJ press releases. Some cases were reported;
some were not. Some releases contained case names; others did not. Some releases reported
settlement amounts; others did not. Some releases were issued when a case was filed, an
indictment returned, or an individual arrested; others did not. Some settlements were
reported and details provided while other settlements were never reported or provided
incomplete information. Consistent reporting, listing, and archiving of press releases would
be invaluable to inform DOJ and relators how to better plead and prepare both criminal
prosecutions of trade fraud and use of the FCA in trade fraud.
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systems more accurate as well as far more efficient. Consistent text
searchability would also allow docket searching systems, particularly
commercial services, to index the individual filings and improve the
usability of the keyword search feature.
Simple, cost-free changes would remedy this search problem. A
more readily available way to access public information about trade
fraud cases would be invaluable to the Department of Justice in crafting
theories of these cases, directing development of precedent, and
identifying trends and problems. Easier access to what is already public
information would help relators and their counsel evaluate, screen, and
prepare cases for presentation to the Department of Justice and filing
of complaints. More information about trade fraud and who is liable
would help businesses and their counsel establish internal systems to
prevent such fraud.
CONCLUSION

As the tide of global trade rises, so will trade fraud. Regardless of
the merits of the free-trade-protectionism debate, trade fraud should be
aggressively pursued. No one has the right to lie about what they are
bringing into a country. This Article discussed the variety of
stakeholders injured when trade laws are flouted and import duties
avoided. Not only is a country's treasury robbed of millions of dollars
in import duties, but honest businesses are hurt by dishonest
competitors, consumers are exposed to unsafe products, and industries
suffer economic losses because of companies that dump products and
engage in predatory pricing.
To gain a better understanding of trade fraud enforcement trends, we
constructed a database of all trade fraud cases pursued in the United
States between 2000 and 2016. While such a database would appear to
be readily available, it is not because of inconsistencies in reporting and
incomplete government data sets. Thus, our database is the first to
compile all trade fraud cases brought in recent years. This database
shows that trade fraud cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice
increased nine-fold between 2000 and 2016. Forty-two percent of these
cases have been criminal prosecutions, while fifty-eight percent have
been civil cases. All civil cases have been brought under the FCA and
almost every FCA case has been initiated by relators under the FCA's
qui tam provisions. All trade fraud cases fall into two basic types of
fraud: misrepresentations regarding the nature of products imported,
and misrepresentations regarding a product's country of origin. We
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discussed the characteristics of each type of fraud and the practical and
policy implications of pursuing each type. We also discussed how and
why many trade fraud cases brought by the Department of Justice and
relators under the FCA fail to include import fraud charges even though
such fraud likely is occurring and is chargeable under the FCA and
applicable criminal statutes.
The FCA has proven uniquely and extraordinarily effective over the
past four decades in combatting health care fraud, defense fraud,
environmental fraud, and other frauds upon federal and state
governments. We discussed how and why it can be as effective in
detecting and deterring trade fraud. We explained how the FCA works,
how it applies to trade fraud, and what makes it effective against trade
fraud. We also discussed the implications for businesses that have
exposure to trade fraud liability. Suspicious pricing ("prices too good
to be true") coupled with sloppy import protocols by suppliers, and the
FCA's "reckless disregard" mens rea, likely subject every business
engaging in the import of goods as well as in the purchase, sale, or
marketing of imported goods to liability under the FCA. We discussed
steps businesses can take to ensure that that their corporate compliance
plans, in-house training, and internal investigation protocols
adequately address their exposure for trade violations. Lastly, we
identified steps policymakers, particularly the U.S. Departments of
Justice and Homeland Security, could take. to enhance the FCA's
effectiveness in combatting trade fraud.

APPENDIX A

Trade Fraud Cases
2000-2016
ALLEGED

STATUTES

CONDIUCT

T6E
OF
FRAUD'

CIVILOR
CRIMINAL

STATUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION

CHAIRT

Relators (Safina
Office Products
and two of its
executives),
competitors of the
defendant,
collectively
received $1.47
million as relator's
award.

2

#

CASE
NAME
2000
11/7/00
United
States v.
Universal
Fruits and
Vegetables
2
et al.
(C.D. Cal.
2000)

Provided
false
information
about
shipping
dates to
avoid
antidumping
duties on
fresh garlic
imponed
from China.

FCA'

2

Civil

Complaint
filed'

3

Civil

$9.8
million
settlement

2661--2004
NONE
______

:2005

5/19/05
United
States ex
rel Safina
Office
Products v.
Oflfice
Depot,'
(D.D.C.
2003)

Defendants
misrepresented where
products
were
manufactured
to qualify
products for
sale to the
U.S.
government.
Products
were in fact
manufactured
in China and
Taiwan,
which are not
approved
under the
Trade
Agreements
Act.

FCA6
Trade
Agreements
Act'

I Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
2 Complaint, United States v. Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp. et al., No. 00-1 1698R
(C.D. Ca. Nov. 7, 2000).
3 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
4 Summary judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,914,474. Judgement held
unenforceable for lack ofjurisdiction. United States v. Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp.,
29 Ct. Int'l Trade 673, Slip Op. 06-79 at 12 (May 25, 2006). See also United States v.
Universal Fruits and Vegetable Corp. 370 F.3d. 829 (9th Cir. 2004).
5 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Safina
Office Products v. Office Depot, No. 1:03-cv-00003-RMC (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2003).
6 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
7 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAME

ALLEDEU,
CONDUCT

5/19/05
United
States ex
ret Safina
Office
Products v.
Office
Depot,'
(D.D.C.
2003)

Defendants
misrepresented where
products
were
manufactured
to qualify
products for
sale to the
U.S.
government.
Products
were in fact
manufactured
in China and
Taiwan,
which are not
approved
under the
Trade
Agreements
Act.
Defendants
misrepresented where
products
were
manufactured
to qualify
products for
sale to the
U.S.
government.
Products
were in fact
manufactured
in China and
Taiwan,
which are not
approved
under the
Trade
Agreements
Act.

10/18/05
United
States ex
rel. Safina
Office
Products v.
Office
Depot,
2
(D.D.C.
2003)

STATUTES

FCA'o
Trade
Agreements
Act"

FCA1S
Trade
Agreements
Actn

TYPE
OF
FRAUD'
3

3

[Vol. 19, 1

STATUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION

CHART

Civil

$4.75
million
Settlement

Relators (Sauna
Office Products
and two of its
executives),
competitors of the
defendant,
collectively
received $712,500
as relator's award.

3

Civil

$7.4
million
settlement

Relators (Safina
Office Products
and two of its
executives),
competitors of the
defendant,
collectively
received $1.11
million as relator's
award.

4

CIVIL OR
CRIMINAL

#

60

8 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
9 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 4.
10 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
11 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
12 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 5.
13 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
14 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).

2018]

61

Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier
of White Collar Crime

'C1-'F
VNE

At4,P GgD
C()NDUI'

STATt~E

4/07/06
United
States ex
rel.
Schweizer
v. OCE
8
N.V,1
(D.D.C.
2006)

Defendants
misrepresented where
products
were
manufactured
to qualify
products for
sale to the
U.S.
government.
Products
were in fact
manufactured
in China and
Taiwan,
which are not
approved
under the
Trade
Agreements
Act.
Defendants
falsely
claimed that
imported
printed
products
were from
the
Netherlands
when they
were from
China.

CIVIL OR
CIMINAL

STATUI

FLT*

CHART

PNVORSMAMTON

URAUD"

________

2/10/06
United
States ex
rel. Safina
Office
Products v.
Office
Depot,
6
' (D.D.C.
2003)

TYPE
OF

FCA"
Trade
Agreements
Act"

3

Civil

$5.02
million
settlement

FCA2o

?

Civil

Settlement
amount of
$1.2
agreed
upon by
DOJ and
defendant
relator
objected.
Remanded.
21

.

*

Relators (Safina
Office Products
and two of its
executives),
competitors of the
defendant,
collectively
received $753,000
as relator's award.

5

6

is Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
16 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, supra note 5.
17 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
18 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-2581 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
19 Complaint for Violations of Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Schweizer
v. OCE N.V., No. 1:06-cv-00648-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 7,2006).
20 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
21 United States ex rel. Schweizer v. OCI N.V, 677 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
that DOJ did not have unfettered discretion to settle FCA cases when a relator objects to the
settlement; courts must examine the reasonableness of the settlement agreement).
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CAE
NAME

ALLYGMT)
C0NDU(-T

ST-IT
'1

6/7/07
United
States v.
Wong, et
al.," (C.D.
Cal. 2007)

4/4/07
United
States v.
Premier
Manufactu
ring, Inc.,
(D. S.C.
2007)

Six
individuals
and ten
scafood
companies
charged with
conspiracy to
avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
conger pike.
Understated
weight of
cigarettes to
avoid
millions of
dollars in
import
duties,

Lacey Act2

26

FCA

TYPE
OF
FRAUD

CT0llA)R
CIUMINAI

sTA11V

RELATOR
INFO

CAR
PrRJ

2

Criminal

Arrested

NA

7

I

Civil

$3.1
million
settlement
(Defendant
previously
agreed to
pay $7.16
million
restitution
as part of a
criminal

NA

8

plea.)

22 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify.goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
23 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,. Two Individuals Arrested for Conspiracy to Import
Falsely Labeled Fish (June 7, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007
/June/07_enrd_413.html.
24 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
25 United States v. Premier Manufacturing Inc., No. 2:05-cr-00344-DCN (D.S.C. Mar.
25, 2005).
26 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAME

ALLEGED
CONDUCT

STATUTES

TYPE
OF

CVILOR
CRIMENAL

1/14/08
United
States v.
t
Wong,2
(C.D. Cal.
2008)

Conspiracy
to avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
conger pike.

Lacey Act'

2

Criminal

3/12/08
United
States v.
True
World
Foods
Chicago,
LLC30
(C.D. Cal.
2007)

Conspiracy
to avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
conger pike.

Lacey Act"

2

Criminal

STATUS

Defendant,
David
Wong,
plead
guilty to
two
misdemeanor
violations
of the
Lacey Act.
Sentenced
to one year
and one
day in
prison
followed
by one
year of
supervised
release.
$25,000
fine
Defendant,
True
World
Foods
Chicago,
LLC, plead
guilty to
violation of
the Lacey
Act.
Sentenced
to a
fine of
$60,000.
Forfeiture
of
$197,930

RELATOR
INFORMATION

63
CHART
#

2018]

NA

9

NA

10

27 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
28 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Illinois Resident Pleads Guilty to Illegally
Dealing in Falsely Labeled Fish From Vietnam (Jan. 14, 2008), https://www.justice.gov
/archive/opa/pr/2008/January/08_enrd 026.html.
29 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
30 United States v. True World Foods Chicago, LLC, No. 2:07-cr-01271 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
15, 2007).
31 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAMBE

ALLEGEWD
COtNDUCT

5/12/08
United
States v.
Intertex
Apparel
Groups,
Inc."
(S.D.N.Y.
2008)

Scheme to
avoid import
duties by
importing
into the
United States
goods
manufactured
in China,
while
misrepresenting that the
goods were
manufactured
in either
Russia or
*Korea.
Conspiracy
to avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
coner pike.

10/30/08
United
States v.
Peter
Xuong
Lam;
Arthur
Yavelberg
3 (C.D.
Cal. 2008)

5/19/09
United
States v.
Peter
Xuong
Lam37
(C.D. Cal
2008)

Conspiracy
to avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
conger pike.

STAT1I1TFA
FCA

TYPE
OF
IFRAUD'2
3

CIVILOR
CRIMINAL
Civil

STTI REAOR,

$2,798,872
settlement.

Relator was a
former employee
of defendant.
Settlement
percentage not
known.

II

.

36

Lacey Act

3

Lacey Act 8

CHART
INFOMATION

#

64

2

Criminal

Two
defendants,
Lam and
Yavelberg,
proceeded
to trial.
Convicted
byjury.

NA

12

2

Criminal

Defendant
Lam
sentenced
to sixtythree
months in
prison.
Forfeiture
of$12
million to
avoid antidumping
duties.
Defendant
Guitierrez
sentenced
to one year
probation.

NA

13

32 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
33 United States v. Intertex Apparel Groups, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-05313-NRB (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2008).
34 6 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
35 Press Release, US Dep't of Justice, Two Found Guilty of Conspiracy Involving the
Importation and Sale of Falsely Labeled Fish from Vietnam (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www
.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-enrd-967.html.
36 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
37 Indictment, United States v. Lam, No. 2:07-cr-00449-PSG (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2007).
38 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).

CASE

NAME

65
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ALLEED

CONDUCt

STATUTES
4

6/26/09
United
States ex
ret.
Furniture
by
Thurston
Inc. and
Lee
Thurston
v. j
Squared
Inc., d/b/a
University
Loft Co.'
(D.D.C.
2009)

Mispresented
the country
of origin
(Malaysian)
of furniture
sold to the
federal
government

FCA '
Trade
Agreements
42
Act

1/20/10
United
States v.
Geerge"
(D.N.
2010)

Conspiracy
to avoid antidumping
custom duties
by falsely
labeling over
ten million
pounds of
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
sole, grouper,
flounder, and
conger pike.

Lacey Act"

TYPE

OF

PRAUD"
3

2

CIVIL OR

STATUS

CRIMINAL

RELATOR

INFORMATION

CHART

#

2018]

Civil

S400,000
settlement

Relator, Furniture
by Thurston inc.
and Lee Thurston,
competitor of
defendant,
received $66,000
as relator's share.

14

Criminal

George,
GEO of
Sterling
Seafood
Corporation, plead
guilty to
one count
of
importing
falsely
labeled
goods and
one count
of selling
falsely
labeled fish
with intent
to defraud.
(Subsequently
sentenced
to 22
months in
prison and
ordered to
pay
$64,173,83
9
mn
restitution
and
$50,000 to
National
Fish and
Wildlife
Foundation

NA

15

.

.

39 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
40 United States ex rel. Furniture by Thurston, Inc. and Lee Thurston v. J. Squared, Inc.,
No. 1:06-cv-01058-RMC (D.C.C. June 8, 2008).
41 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729 33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-'140).
42 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
43 United States v. George, No. 2:10-cr-00029-FSH (D. N.J. Jan. 20, 2010).
44 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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NA'VE
1/28/10
United
States v.
Karen L.
Blyth, et
al" (S.D.
Ala. 2010)

II'1
I CONDjuCT

STATUTES

Defendants
indicted on
twenty-eight
counts for
falsely
describing
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
"wild caught
sole" to
avoid antidumping
duties.
Defendants,
co-owners of
seafood
companies in
Phoenix,
Arizona
(Blyth) and
Pensacola,
Florida
(Phelps).
Some of the
fish tested
positive for
antibiotics
banned from
U.S. food.

Lacey Act'

Provided
false
information
to federal
government
on contracts,
including
country of

FCA49

t

TYPE
OF

Cl~lLO
CTMAL

STIATUS

RFLATOR
rN,

C(HART

ItTON

2

Criminal

indicted.

NA

16

3

Civil

Settlement
of$6.25
million.

NA

17

,2011____

1/13/11
United
States v.
Fastenal
Co.,48
(W.D. Mo.
2011)

I ongin.

45 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
46 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-0001 1-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28,
2010).
47 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
48 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Minnesota-based National Hardware Store
Distributor Fastenal to Pay U.S. $6.25 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan.
13, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minnesota-based-national-hardware-store-dis.
tributor-fastenal-pay-us-625-million-resolve-false.
49 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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A

iE0

NAME

CONDUCIT

1/24/11
United
States v.
Blyth et
al." (S.D.
Ala. 2010)

Falsely
described
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
"wild caught
sole" to
avoid antidumping
duties and
marketed the
Fish as
expensive
scafood.
Falsely
described
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
"wild caught
sole" to
avoid antidumping
duties and
marketed the
fish as
expensive

5/5/11
United
States v.
Blyth et
al." (S.D.
Ala. 2011)

STAtUTES
OF

C1LOR
CRIMINAL

Lacey Act,'Receiving
smuggled
goods,"
5
misbranding

2

Criminal

Defendants
Blyth and
Phelps pled
guilty to
thirteen
counts.

Lacey Act,"6
Receiving
smuggled
goods5t

2

Criminal

Lacey Act,'9
Receiving
smuggled
goodsm

2

Criminal

Sentenced
to thirtythree
months
(Karen L.
Blyth) and
twentyfour
months
(David
H.M.
Phelps).
Both fined
$5000.
Sentenced
to thirteen
months in
prison.

seafood.
5/26/11
United
States v.
Popa (S.D.
Ala.
2011)'8

Falsely
described
imported
Vietnamese
catfish as
"wild caught
sole" to
avoid antidumping
duties and
marketed the
fish as
expensive
seafood.

STATUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION
NA

.67
CHMART
#

2018]

18

19

20

50 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
51 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-0001 1-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28,
2010).
52 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
53 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
54 Id.
55 United States v. Karen L. Blyth, et al., No. 1:10-cr-0001 1-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28,
2010).
56 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
57 18 U.S.C.S. § 352 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
58 United States v. Popa, No. 1:10-cr-00011-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2010).
59 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-78 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
60 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASENAME

AL~lEGEDF
CONDUCT

6/1/11
United
States e
reL Bukh
v.
Guldmann,
ic.62 (N.
D. Ill.
2011)
8/18/11
United
States v.
Cone et al.
65 (E.D.
Va. 2011)

Falsified
country of
origin in
sales of
medical
equipment to
Department
of Veterans
Affairs.
Imported and
sold
counterfeit
computer
networking
equipment,
avoided
import
duties.

8/31/11
United
States a
rel.
Karlin v.
Noble
Jewelry
Holdings
Ltd.,"
(S.D.N.Y

Understated
the value of
imported
jewelry.

STATUTES

FCA61

TYPE
Of
FRAUD"'
3

CIVIL1OR
CRIMI[NAL

STAITS

RELATOR

INFORMATION'i

CHART

#

68

Civil

$2 million
settlement

Relator was an
employee of
defendant.

21

Wire Fraud,"
Conspiracy"
Importation
and sale of
improperly
declared
goods,"
wire fraudti

I

Criminal

Convicted
t
byjury o

NA

22

FCA"

I

Civil

$3.85
million
settlement

Relator, Kenneth
Karlin, employee
of defendant,
receive $727,000
relator's share.

23

2011)

61 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57- 154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
62 United States ex rel. Bukh v. Gulmann, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01089-SDM-JSS (N.D. Ill.
June 1, 2011).
63 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
64 DOJ did not intervene in the case. $2 Million FCA Settlement, ASHCRAFT & GEREL,
LLP, http://ashcraftand gerel.com/news/2-million-fca-settlement/.
65 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Cone et al., No. 1:10-cr-00317-GBL (E.D.
Va. Nov. 10, 2010).
66 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
67 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
68 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 542, 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
69 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
70 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Cone, No. 1:10-cr-00317-GBL (E.D. Va.
Nov. 10, 2010), rev'd, No. 11-4934 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2013).
71 Complaint and Jury Demand, United States ex rel. Karlin v. Noble Jewelry Holdings
Ltd., No. 1:08-cv-07826-JGK-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011).
72 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).

-CAS F
NAME

4/24/12
United
States ex
rel,
Dickson v.
Toyo Mfg.
Co. Ltd 14
(W.D.N.C.
2012)

5/8/12
United
States ex
rel.
Scutellaro
v. Direct
t
Resource"
(D.D.C.
2010)

Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier
of White Collar Crime
ALLr4,lifD CONDUt-r

Misrepresent
-ed country
of origin to
avoid paying
antidumping
and
countervailing duties.
(Represented
that product,
printing ink,
was
manufactured
Japan and
Mexico,
when in fact
ink was
manufactured
in China and
India).
Defendants
falscly
claimed that
goods sold to
the U.S.
government
(office
supplies)
were
manufactured
in a country
with a
reciprocal
trade
agreement
with the
United States
when in fact
the goods
were from
China, which
does not have
such an
agreement.

STATTES

TYPE9
OF
FRAUD"

CIVILOR
CRIMINAL

-STAU

FCA7

2

Civil

United
States
intervenes.

FCAn7
Trade
Agreements
Act"

3

Civil

$450,000
settlement.

RE TO
INFORMATION

69
CH

T

#

2018]

24

Louis Scutellaro,
owner of a
competitor of the
defendant,
received $675,000
relator's share.

25

73 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
74 Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Mfg. Co., No. 3:09-CV438 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2010).
75 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. I15-140).
76 Complaint, United States ex rel. Scutellaro v. Direct Resources, Inc., No. 1:10-cv001 13-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2010).
77 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
78 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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KME

OF

COPDmj)Ix
_____

6/8/12
United
States ex
rel
Ludlow
v.
CMAI
Industries,
LLC"
(E.D.
Mich.
2012)

7/9/12
United
States v.
ADC
Telecomm
unications
Inc.2
(D.D.C.
2012)

Misclassilied
auto parts as
"unfinished"
to evade $2.5
million in
duties. CMAI
collected the
duties due
from its
customers
but pocketed
the money
instead of
paying the
duties.
Defendants
falsely
claimed that
goods it sold
to the U.S.
government
(telecommunications
hardware,
such as
modems)
were
imported
from a
country
which has a
reciprocal
trade
agreement
with the
United
States, when
in fact the
good were
imported
from China,
which does
not have such
an
agreement.

FCA81

FCA,tt
Trade
Agreements
Act"

FRAUD'
2

3

[Vol. 19, 1
INFORMATIO

CIUMINAl.
Civil
and
Criminal

$6.3
million
settlement,
Guilty plea
to criminal
charges.
Received
sentence of
two years'
probation
and
$25,000
fine.

Civil

Company
disclosed
its
violations;
S million
settlement.

Relator, Theodore
Ludlow, former
sales account
manager of
defendant,
received
$1.2 million as
relator's share.

26

27

79 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime.
80 Complaint for Violation of the Civil False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Ludlow v.
CMAI Industries, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-14860-PDB-MKM (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009).
81 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
82 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Telecommunications Firm to Pay Us $1 Million
to Settle Alleged Violations of the Trade Agreements Act (July 9, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telecommunications-firm-pay-us-1-million-settle-allegedviolations-trade-agreements-act.
83 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
84 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAME

ALLEGED
CONDUCT

STATUTES

TYPE
OP

8/27/12
United
States v.
Fai Po
Jewellery
(H.K.) Co.,
LTD' (D.
Ak. 2012)

Understated
value of
jewelry
imported into
the U.S.
avoiding
more than $1
million in
duties.

Intentionally
defrauding
U.S. of
customs
duties"

I

Crimmal

11/15/12
United
States v.
Chavez Is
(S.D. Ca.
2012)

Avoided $18
million in
customs
duties by
falsely
stating that
more than
$100 million
in Chinese
goods were
traveling
through the
territory of
the United
States when
in fact the
goods
entered the
commerce of
the United
States.

Conspiracy,"
Entry of
goods by
means of
false
statements,"
Obstruction
of justicel

I

Criminal

C-VILOR
CRIMINAL

STAT(S
Defendant
pled guilty
to one
count
information.
Sentenced
to three
years of
probation
and
ordered to
pay
$800,000
criminal
fine,
restitution
of
$1,017,737
, costs of
investigation of
$144,324.
Chavez
plead
guilty and
was
sentenced
to thirtyseven
months in
prison and
forfeiture
of property
located in
Tecate, Ca.

ELATOR
INFORMATION

71
CHART
#

2018]

NA

28

NA

29

85 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
86 Complaint, United States v. Fai Po Jewellery, No. 3:12-cr-00068-SLG (D.C. Ak. Aug.
8,2012).
87 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
88 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:12-cr-03137-MMA (S.D. Ca. July 23, 2012).
89 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
90 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
91 18 U.S.C.S. § 1519 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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C
NAME

ALLEGED
CONDUCT

STATUTES

11/29/12
Unites
States v.
Garbarino,
5
(S.D.N.Y
.2012)

Avoided
duties owed
by
understating
the weight
(over
100,000
pounds) and
value (more
than $10
million) of
Russian and
Iranian
caviar.
Misrepresented country
of origin to
avoid paying
antidumping
and
countervailing duties.
(Represented
that product,
printing ink,
was
manufactured
Japan and
Mexico,
when in fact.
ink was
manufactured
in China and
India).

Entry of
goods falsely
classified,"
Entry of
goods my
means of
false
statements,"
Smuggling'

I

Criminal

Defendant
pled guilty.
Sentenced
to time
served,
fined
$10,000,
and $3
million in
restitution.

NA

30

FCA"

2

Civil

$45 million
settlement.

Relator, John
Dickson, president
of competitor of
defendant,
received over
$7,875,000 as
relator's share.

31

12/17/12
United
States ex
rel.
Dickson v.
Toyo Ink
Mfg. 7Co.,
Ltd.,
(W.D.N.C.
2012)

STATUS RELATOR
CRIMINAL

CHARTr
INFORMATION

#

YPE-VLOR
OF

92 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
93 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Caviar Distributor Pleads
Guilty to Multi-million Dollar Customs Fraud Scheme (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.ice
.gov/news/releases/caviar-distributor-pleads-guilty-multi-million-dollar-customs-fraudscheme.
94 18 U.S.C.S. § 541 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
95 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
96 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
97 United States ex rel. Dickson v. Toyo Ink Mfg. Co., Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-00438-RJCDSC (W.D. N.C. May 14, 2010).
98 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE

ALLEGED

NAME

STATITES

CONDUCT

TYPE
OF

FRAUD 99

I

CIVILOR

_9iiTA

CRIMINAL

PELATOR
INFORMATION

CHART
#

2018]

12/2212
United
States v.
Apego
Inc.,1W
(N.D. Ga.
2012)

Conspiracy
to avoid an
estimated
$20 million
in duties on
paper by
"transshiping" Chinese
products
through
Taiwan and
labeling them
as "Made in
Taiwan."

Entry of
goods falsely
t
classified," o
Entry of
goods by
means of
false
statements1o2

2

Criminal

Indictment
filed

NA

32

2/20/13
United
States v.
Groeb
Farms, Inc.
et al.ios
(N.D. Ill.
2013)

Misrepresented country
of origin as
India or
Malaysia for
honey from
China to
avoid more
than $180
million in
anti-dumping
duties.
Honey tested
positive for
Chloramphenicol, an
antibiotic not
allowed in
food products
in the U.S.
Misrepresented country
of origin for
products
made in
China in
sales to the
U.S.
government.

Entry of
goods by
means of
false
statements,Smuggling"o'

2

Criminal

Charges
filed and
deferred
prosecution
agreements
reached
with
companies
and
agreements
to plead
guilty
reached
with
individual
defendants.

NA

33

3

Civil

$5.66
million
settlement

Relator, Joe
Liotine, former
sales
representative of
defendant,
received
$1,585,892 as
relator's share.

34

3/29/13
United
States ex
rel.
Liotine, v.
CDWGovernme
at, Inc.,
(S.D. Il.
2012)

7

FCAio
Trade
Agreements
Actica

99 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
100 Criminal Indictment, United States v. Apego, Inc., No. 1: 12-cr-00350-SCJ-AJB (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 17, 2012).
101 18 U.S.C.S. § 541 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
102 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
103 Violation, United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 1:13-cr-00139 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
2013).
104 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
105 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
106 False Claims Complaint, United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No.
3:05-cv-00033-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2005).
107 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
108 Id.
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CASE

ALLEGED

NAME

CONDUCT

5/30/13
United
States ex
rel.
Customs
Fraud
Investigati
ons, LLC
v.
Victaulic
Co.ilo
(E.D. Pa.
2013)

Failed to
properly
mark
imported iron
and steel pipe
fittings with
country of
origin,
thereby
avoiding
"marking"
duties of
10% of the
value of
imports.
Avoided antidumping
duties of 3033% and
countervailing duties of
374.14% on
aluminum
made in
China by
"transshipping" through
Malaysia.

6/21/13
United
States v.
GarciaAdarmc,t
(D.P.R.
2013)

STATTES
FCAtti

Conspiracy,
r1
Smuggling,"'
Wire fraudt'
Money
laundering'1t

TYE

ClIVfLO

OF
FRAUD'"
I

CRIMINAL

2

STATUS

INFORMATION

COELA
IART
#

74

Civil

Pending
remand
after Third
Circuit
held that
failure to
properly
mark
imports is
a false
claim
under the
FCA.ttt

Relator is a
company that
conducts research
and analysis on
potential customs
fraud.

35

Criminal

Indictment
returned
against
three
individuals
and three
companies.

NA

36

109 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
o10
United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaylic Co., No. 5:13cv-02983-MAM (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2013).
I1 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
112 United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co. 839 F.3d
242 (3d Cir. 2016).
113 Indictment, United States v. Garcia-Adarme, No. 3:13-cr-00353-FAB (D.P.R. June
20, 2013).
114 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
115 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
116 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
117 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAME

ALLEGED
CONDUCl

11/14/13
United
States ex
ret. Valenti
v.
Tai Shan
Golden
Gain
Aluminum
Products
Ltd., et
al.,'l9
(M.D. Fl.
2013)

Avoided
antidunping
and
countervailing duties, by
falsely
alleging that
aluminum
extrusions
were from
Malaysia
when they
were in fact
fromChina.

'26i4
1/24/14
United
States ex
rel. Estey
v.
Tennessee
Orthopaedi
c Clinics
PC, et
al.-0 (E.D.
Tenn.
2012)

Misrepresented country
of medication
thereby
obtaining
reimburseme
nt from
Medicare,
Medicaid and
other federal
programss for
medications
not approved
I by the FDA.

STATUTES
125

FCA

2

FCA1 1

TYP
OF
FRAUDiss
2

3

75

STATUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION

CHART

Civil

Scutlements of
morn than
$4.58
million:
Defendant
Basco
Mfg, Co.
settled for
$1.1
million;
defendant
C.R.
Laurence
Co. Inc.,
settled for
$2,300,000
; defendant
Southeastern
Aluminum
Products
settled for
$650,000;
and
defendant
Waterfall
Group
LLC
settled for
$100,000.

Relator
James F. Valenti,
received $555,100
as relator's share.

37

Civil

$1185
million
settlement.

CIVIL OR
CRIMINAL

Relator, Douglas
Estey, a
physician's
assistant who
spoke to medical
providers about the
product, received
$323,750 as
relator's share.

#

2018]

38

118 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White CollarCrime.
119 Complaint, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products
Ltd., No. 3:1 1-cv-00368-BJD-MCR (M.D. Fl. Oct. 18, 2013).
120 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
121 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Importers to Pay Over $3 Million to
Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/three-importers-pay-over-3-million-settle-false-claims-act
-suit-alleging-evaded-customs.
122 Complaint, United States ex rel. Estey v. Tennessee Orthopaedic Clinics, P.C., No,
3:12-CV-85 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2012).
123 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CA
NAME

3/12/14
United
States ex
rel.
Zhonghui
Tu v.
Bizlink
Tech., Inc.,
(N.D.
Cal. 2014)

4/9/14
United
States e
rel.
Michael
Krigstein
v. Siouni
& Zar
Corp., et
al.127
(S.D.N.Y.
2014)
4/21/14
Unites
States ex
rel.
Jimenez v.
Otter
Products,
2
Inc.,1 9 (D.
Colo.
2014)

A
G
COoDUCF

STATUTa

TYPE
OF
FRAUDI

COVILOR
CRIMINAL
Civil

STArUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION

CH1 ART

$1.2
million
settlement.

Relator,
Zhonghui Tu, a
former manager of
the defendant,
received $252,000
as relator's share.

39

#

76

I

Understated
the value of
goods
imported
(used two
sets of
invoices; one
set stated
actual price
of goods, the
other set
falsely stated
a lower cost).
Import duties
were
calculated on
the lower,
false cost.
Understated
value of
imported
apparel to
avoid
customs
duties.

FCAtt

FCA 1

I

Civil

$10 million
settlement.

Relator, Michael
Krigstein, former
employee of
defendant Dana
Kay Inc., received
$2.1 million as
relator's sham.

40

Avoided
paying
import duties
owed by
understated
the value of
product
imported
(protective
cases for
electronic
devices).

FCA,3O
Tariff Act of
1930131

I

Civil

$4.3
million
settlement.

Relator, Bonnie M.
Jimenez, former
employee of
defendant,
received
$830,000 as
relator's sham.

41

2

124 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
125 Complaint, United States ex rel. Tu v. Kuo, No. 3:12-cv-04166-WHO (N.D. Cal. Aug.
8,2012).
126 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
127 Complaint, United States ex rel. Krigstein v. Siouni & Zar Corp., No. 1:11 -cv-04247CM (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013).
128 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
129 Complaint, United States ex rel. Jimenez v. Otter Products, LLC, No. 1:11 -cv-02937RM-MJW (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2014).
130 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
131 19 U.S.C.S. § 1592(c)(4) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAME

ALLEGEI)
CONDUCT

STAT-T S

TYPE
OF

5/5/14
United
States v..
Nguyen,'"
(E.D. Cal.
2014)

Nguyen
made false
declarations
to avoid
customs
duties
(declared
clothing
imported
from China
as samples
rather than
for sale).
Avoided
paying
import
duties, by
falsely
stating that
goods from
Italy and
India were
from Mexico.
Santos was a
U.S. Customs
broker. His
broker
responsibilities involved
valuing
shipments for
importation
into the U.S.
and
submitting
appropriate
payments on
behalfofhis
clients for
import duties
due. He
collected
correct
amount from
his clients,
and pocked
the
difference.

Conspiracy,
" Mail
Fraud,"'
Money
3
laundering,' 6

I and 2

Criminal

Entry of
goods by
false
certification,

I and 2

Criminal

6/4/14
United
States v.
Santos,'"
(S.D. Tex.
2014)

138

t

Smuggling,' '
False
Statement to
law
enforcement

.

CVILOR
CRIMINAL

STATUS

Sentenced
to one year
in prison,
and
ordered to
pay
$70,000 in
restitution.
Forfeiture
of
$400,000
in
property.
Sentenced
to twentyeight
months in
prison;
paid
$140,000
in
restitution.

ATORl
INPORMAATION

77
CHARI
#

2018]

NA

42

NA

43

132 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
133 Indictment, United States v. Nguyen, No. 1:13-cr-00036-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Jan.
31, 2013).
134 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
135 18 U.S.C.S. §1341 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
136 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
137 Indictment, United States v. Santos, No. 5:12-cr-01 161 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012).
138 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
139 18 U.S.C.S. § 545 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
140 18 U.S.C.S. § 1001 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CASE
NAM

AL
ED
CND

8/19/14
United
States ex
rel.
Simmons
v.
Samsung
Electronics
America,
Inc., ct
al.,t
(D. Md.
2011)

Defendants
falsely
certified that
goods sold to
the U.S.
government
were from
Korea or
Mexico, both
of which
have a
reciprocal
trade
agreements
with the U.S.,
as required in
contracts to
sell goods to
the federal
government.
In fact, the
goods were
manufactured
in China,
which does
not have such

STAT1TS
43

TYPE
Of

iLO
CRIMINAL.

STAT

RE-lO
INFORMATION

CHART

FCAl
Trade
Agreements
Act'"

3

Civil

$2.3
million
settlement.

Robert Simmons,
former Samsung
employee,
received $414,000
relator's share.

44

Entry of
goods by
means of
false
statements"

2

Criminal

Pled guilty
to one
count of
importing
merchandise from
China by
means of
false
statements.

NA

45

an

9/9/14
United
States v.
Sandiford,
145 (D.N.J.
2014)

agreement.
Falsified
which
Chinese
factories
made
wooden
bedroom
furniture,
thereby
paying a
7.24%
antidumping
duty instead
of the 216%
antidumping
duty owed.
Avoided $7
million in
duties owed.

141 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
142 Complaint, United States ex rel. Simmons v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No.
AW- 11-2971 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2011).
143 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
144 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
145 Complaint, United States v. Sandiford, No. 2:14-cr-00520-WJM (D.N.J. Sept. 9,
2014).
146 18 U.S.C.S. § 542 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CA 5
NAME
12/4/14
United
States ex
rel.
McKinney
v. DHS
Technologi
es, LLCtas
(M.D. Pa.
2011)
2015
4/2/15
United
States ex
rel Cox et
al v.
Mcdtronic,
Inc. et
al.,"' (D.
Minn.)
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ALLEGED'F

'TYPE
Of

CONDUCT
Falsely
represented
the country
of origin for
products sold
to the U.S. so
as to qualify
products for
federal
contracts.

FCA,'"
Trade
Agreements
Act"o

Defendants
falsely
claimed that
goods sold to
the federal
government
(cardiac care
devices and
devices used
in spin
surgeries)
were made in
the U.S. or
another
country with
a reciprocal
trade
agreement.
with the U.S.,
when in fact
the goods
were made in
China and
Malaysia,
which do not
have such
agreements
with the U.S.

FCA 2
Trade
Agreements
Act"'

15

CIVIL OR
CRIMINAL

S'TATUs

" RELATORt
INFORMATION

79
-CHA'RT
0

3

Civil

$1.9
million.

Relator, former
employee of
defendant,
received
approximately
$361,000 relators
award.

46

3

Civil

$4.41
million
settlement.

Three relators,
former employees
of defendants,
share
$749,700.

47

147 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
148 United States ex rel. McKinney v. DHS Technologies, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-00146RDM-MCC (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011).
149 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
150 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
151 Complaint, United States ex rel. Cox, Medtronic, Inc., No. 0:12-cv-02562-PAM-JSM
(D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2012).
152 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
153 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-81 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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STATUTES
CONDUCT

6/1/15
United
States v.
Xilin Chen
et all"
(C.D. Cal.
2015)

Avoided
paying
customs
duties owed
by claiming
merchandise
imported
from China
was worth
$86,635,
when the true
value of the
clothing was
$175,535.
Laundered
money for
drug cartel.
Procured
citizenship
by means of
false
statements
(falsely
declared he
was not
involved in
illegal
activity).
Avoided
antidumping
and
countervailing duties, by
falsely
alleging that
aluminum
extrusions
were from
Malaysia
when they
were in fact
from China.

2/12/15
United
States ex
rel. Valenti
v. Tai
Shan
Golden
Gain
Aluminum
Products.
Ltd.,t's
(M.D. Fl.
2011)

Money
laundering,'4
Presentation
of false
immigration
document'"

TYPE
OF
4
FRAUD'
I

CIWLR
CRIMINAL

STATUS

RELATOR
INFORMATION

CHART

Criminal

Defendant,
Xilin
Chen, pled
guilty to
three
felony
counts
including
customs
fraud,
conspiracy
to launder
money and
unlawful
procurement of
citizenship.
Sentenced
to 110
months in
prison and
$2 million
fine.

NA

48

Civil

$385,000
settlement
(Defendant
Winfield);
$50,000
settlement
(Defendant
Ma).

Relator, James F.
Valenti Jr.,
received
$79,000 in
relator's share.

49

-

NAME

#

80

FCASS

2

154 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties, (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
155 United States v. Xilin Chen et al., No. 2:14-cr-00499-PA (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014).
156 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
157 18 U.S.C.S. § 1546 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
158 Complaint, United States ex rel. Valenti v. Tai Shan Golden Gain Aluminum Products
Ltd., No. 3:11 -cv-00368-BJD-MCR (M.D. Fl. Oct. 18, 2013).
159 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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CAH AtILEGRr
NAE CONDUCGT

TTR

rYPR

-C6V8 OR

OF

CRIMNAL

9/8/15
United
States v.
Magness,
et A,(W.D.N.Y.
2015)

Misrepresented nature of
imported
magnesium
product to
qualify for a
5% duty
instead of
applicablc
305% duty.

Conspiracy to
smuggle
merchandise
into the
United States
and
conspiracy to
launder
moneyis2

2

Criminal

10/6/15
United
States v.
Giddens et
al.,-"
(E.D. TX.
2014)

Defendants
misrepresented fortythree
imported
shipments of
prescription
drugs such as
Xanax@ and
Valium@ as
"gifts" or

Conspiracy"
Misbranded
drug
offenses'"

I

Criminal

$TAVS-

'RETATOR1NIFORMA100'

Father
(Gregory
Magness)
sentenced
to eighteen
months and
ordered to
pay
$6,246,605
in
restitution.
Son (Justin
Magness)
sentenced
to one year
probation
and
ordered to
pay $4,500

81
-NIAT4

NA`'3

50

NA

SI

restitution.

Defendants
Giddens
and Hollis
sentenced
to fifteen
months in
prison.

"toys" to

reduce duties
owed. The
imported
dritgs were
sub-potent or
contained
entirely
different
active
ingredients
from
legitimate
._

_

versions.

160 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
161 Indictment, United States v. Magness, No. 1:10-cr-00125-WMS-JJM (W.D.N.Y. Apr.
30, 2010).
162 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
163 Complaint, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, Inc., No. 1: 10-cv00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010).
164 Indictment, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL (E.D. Tex. Oct.
24, 2014).
165 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
166 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331 (a), 352(a), 352(f)(1), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115140).
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NAE

CONOLC

OFt

CHI~M1AL

12/21/15
United
States ex
rel.
University
Loft
Company
v.
University
Furnishing
s, LP,'"
(W.D. Tex.
2015)

Avoided antidumping
duties by
falsely
describing
imported
fuimiture
from China
as "office
furniture,"
which is not
subject to
antidumping
duties, when
in fact the
furniture was
"bedroom
furniture"
which was
subject to
antidumping
duties.

FCA1w

2

Civil

$15 million
settlement.

10/6/15
United
States v.
Giddens ct
al.,170
(E.D. Tex.
2014)

Defendants
misrepresented fortythree
imported
shipments of
prescription
drugs such as
Xanax@ and
Valium@ as
"gifts" or
"toys" to
reduce duties
owed. The
imported
drugs were
sub-potent or
contained
entirely
different
active
ingredients
from
legitimate
versions.

Conspiracy"'
Misbranded
drag
offenses"

I

Criminal

Defendant
Nix
sentenced
to fifteen
months in
prison.

[Vol. 19, 1
INrOttMAI tON

9

Relator, University
Loft Co,
competitor of
defendant,
received $2.25
million as relator's
share.

52

53

-

167 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
168 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Texas-Based Importers Agree to Pay $15
Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit for Alleged Evasion of Customs Duties (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-based-importers-agree-pay-15-million-settle
false-claims-act-suit-alleged-evasion.
169 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
170 Indictment, United States v. Giddens, No. 6:14-cr-00061-MHS-JDL (E.D. Tex. Oct.
24, 2014).
171 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
172 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 331 (a), 352(a), 352(f)(1), 333(a)(2) (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115140).
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TYPE
STATUTES
ALLEGED
CASE
i
0F CRIMINALINFORMATION
NAM0CONDUCT
FRAUD'_
7
2
FCA'1
Avoided
2/22/16
$2,127,420 in Entry of
United
goods by
antidumping
States ex
false
duties on
rel.
documentatio
imports of
Graphite
n76
graphite
Electrode
Sales, Inc.
electrodes
used in steel
v. AmenmanufacturSource
Holdings,
ing
from China
Inc.,1a
(W.D. Pa.
by falsifying
2016)
size of
electrodes.
2
FCAirs
Conspiracy
3/28/16
to sell
United
defective
States ex
infrared
rel. Reade
counterMfg. Co.
measure
v. ESM
flares to the
Group,
Inc.,t"
US
(W.D.N.Y.
(magnesium
in flares
2016)
failed to meet
specifications

STATUS

RELATOR

CHART

Civil

$3 million
settlement.

Relator, Graphite
Electrode Sales
Inc., a competitor
of the defendant,
received $480,000
as relator's sham.

54

Civil

$8 million
settlement.
179

Relator, Reade
Mfg. Co,
competitor of
defendant,
received
$400,000 as
relator's sham.

55

CVILOR

). Also,

avoided
antidumping
duties by
misrepresenting the nature
of imported
magnesium
product to
qualify
imports for a
5% duty
instead of
applicable
305% duty.

173 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud: The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
174 Qui Tam Complaint, United States ex rel. Graphite Electrode Sales, Inc. v. Amerisource Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00474-JFC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013).
175 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
176 19 U.S.C.S. § 1484 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
177 Jury Trial Demand, United States ex rel. Reade Mfg. Co. v. ESM Group, Inc., No.
I 10-cv-00504-WMS (W.D.N.Y June 17, 2010).
178 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
179 Prior to the civil settlement, five former ESM employees pled guilty to related
criminal charges, including ESM's former president, Charles Wright. The criminal
defendants were ordered to pay more than $14 million in restitution. Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Tennessee and New York-Based Defense Contractors Agree to Pay $8
Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Involving Defective Countermeasure Flares
Sold to the U.S. Army (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tennessee-and-new
also
See
-york-based-defense-contractors-agree-pay-8-million-settle-false-claims-act.
Magness, supra note 140.
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7CASE
N AM r.

ALLUCONTAICT

STTfE

TY PE
IQF

4/27/16
United
States cc
rel. Wells
v. Z
Gallerie,
8
LLC,1'
(S.D. Ga.
2016)

Avoided
antidumping
duties by
falsely
describing
Chinese
wooden
bedroom
furniture
(which is
subject to
antidumping
duties) as
"grand
chests" and
"hall chests"
(which are
not subject to
antidumping
duties).
Avoided antidumping
duties by
falsely
describing
imported
furniture
from China
as "office
furniture"
which is not
subject to
antidumping
duties when
in fact the
furniture was
"bedroom
furniture,"
which was
subject to
antidumping
duties.

FCA,"
Trade
Facilitation
and Trade
Enforcement
Actf

2

FCA"as

2

9/30/16
United
States ex
rel.
Bissanti,
Jr. v.
Daniel
Scott
Goldman
t
et al,i
(W.D. Tex.
2016).

[Vol. 19, 1

STATS

111RELA I Ol
YNORMA~11ON

CHAR!-

Civil

$15 million
settlement.

Relator, Kelly
Wells, an ecommerce retailer
of fumiture,
received $2.4
million as relator's
award.

56

Civil

$1,525,000
settlement.

Relator, Matthew
L. Bissanti, Jr.,
prior employee of
defendant,
received $228,750
relator's share.

57

CVI
CRIMINAL.

#

84

180 Types of fraud: (1) falsely describe the import to avoid or minimize import duties; (2)
falsify country of origin to avoid import duties; (3) falsify country of origin to qualify goods
for sale to the U.S. government. See text and accompanying footnotes 57-154 in Trade
Fraud:The Wild, New Frontierof White Collar Crime.
181 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, California-Based Z Gallerie LLC Agrees to Pay
$15 Million to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties (Apr. 26,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-based-z-gallerie-llc-agrees-pay-15-mil
lion-settle-false-claims-act-suit-alleging.
182 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
183 19 U.S.C.S. § 4301 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
184 Complaint, United States ex rel. Bissanti v. Goldman, No. 1:14-cv-00497-SS (W.D.
Tex. May 29, 2014).
185 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-33 (Lexis through Pub. L. No. 115-140).

APPENDIX B: TRADE DATA

.

B-1. Antidumping and Countervailing Orders by Product, 2016
B-2. Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, 2016
B-3. Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, Comparison, 2005
and 2015
B-4. Countervailing Duty Orders Issued by Country, Comparison,
2005 and 2015
B-5. Countries Named in Antidumping and Countervailing Orders
by U.S. 2016
B-6. Total Combined AD/CVD Orders Per FY
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APPENDIX B-1

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties by Product, 2016'

CH
PR3%

2%

MS%

58%
13%

Active AD/CVD Orders by Product: 2016
Product Type
AG (Agriculture and Food)
CH (Chemicals)
ISM (Iron and Steel: Mills)
ISO (Iron and Steel: Other)
ISP (Iron and Steel: Pipe)
MM (Metals and Minerals)
MSC (Miscellaneous Products)
PRSG (Plastic, Rubber, Stone, Glass)
TX (Textiles and Apparel)
ME (Machinery and Electric Equipment)
PSRG (correction by USITC for PRSG
category)

Number of Orders
0
1
28
0
6
0
7
6
0
0
0

,

I Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Orders Currently in Place, U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, https://www.usitc.gov/trade rernedy/73 1_ad_701_cvd/investigations.htm (under
research tools sidebar click on "AD/CVD Orders") (last visited on June 2, 2017).
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APPENDIX

B-2

Antidumping Orders Issued by Country, 20162
Tud"e
6%

Tahwa
2%

UAL
4%

Australa
4%

10%

Omnan Prua
Canada

,1

2%

----

1a*
19%

Koa
15*4

jaw
4%

IndoiieSia
4%

India
17%

2 Chad P. Brown, Global Antidumping Database, WORLD BANK, http://econ.world
bank.org/ttbd/gad/ (last visited on May 31,2017). We used the spreadsheets for each country
with "detailed data in the database" provided by the Global Antidumping Database
(supposedly current through 2015) and initiated a search that singled out only the affirmative
(A) decisions in the F DUMP DEC field (there were partial decisions as well however,
because they were not always affirmative, the info was ambiguous). Then we ordered the
affirmative decisions chronologically by F ADDATE (the date the final AD measure was
imposed on), counting how many decisions occurred in 2005 and how many occurred in
2015.
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APPENDIX B-3

Antidumping Orders Issued by Country,
Comparison, 2005 and 20153
Couotry

Nuwber of AD Orders

Number of AD Orders

2005

2015

8
3
3
4
5
9
38
6
5
9
5
3
14

11
10
31
13
16
19
22
2
7
7
2
3
18

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
European Union
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Russia
South Korea
USA

3 Id See text accompanying note 2.
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B-4

Countervailing Duty Orders Issued by Country,
Comparison, 2005 and 20154
Country

Affirmative CVD
Decisions 2015

Total Affirmative CVD
Decisions
(note varying time

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
European Union
Mexico
United States

NA
2
NA
2
NA
NA
1
NA
9

periods)
5 total from 1992-1998
10 total from 2001-2015
10 total from 1991-2008
33 total from 1985-2015
2 total in 2000
6 total from 2010-2014
44 from 1977-2015
9 total from 1995-2014
216 from 1981-2015

4 Chad P. Brown, Global CountervailingDuties Database, WORLD BANK, http://econ
.worldbank.org/ttbd/gcvd/ (last visited May 31, 2017). To gather this data, we used the
spreadsheets for each country with "detailed data in the database" provided by the Global
Countervailing Duties Database (listed as current through 2015) and initiated a search that
singled out only the affirmative (A) decisions in the FSUBDEC field (there were partial
decisions as well however, because they were not always affirmative, the info was
ambiguous). We ordered the affirmative decisions chronologically by F CVD DATE (the
date the final CVD measure was imposed on), counting how many decisions occurred in
2005 and how many occurred in 2015. We did not count any decisions where the date was
missing (where there were no decisions for the year based on our criteria). We listed as
"NA" where information was unavailable or because it was 0.
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Countries Named in Antidumping and Countervailing Orders by U.S. 5
2016
Country

Number of Orders

China

9

India

8

Korea

7

Brazil

5

Turkey

3

Australia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
U.K.

2

5 Antidumping and CountervailingDuty OrdersCurrently in Place, supra note 1.
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Total Combined AD/CVD Orders Per FY6
Tot CanedAev OrdmPedY
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